Universal psychometrics: measuring cognitive abilities in the machine kingdom by Hernández Orallo, José et al.
 Document downloaded from: 
 
This paper must be cited as:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The final publication is available at 
 
 
Copyright 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.06.001
http://hdl.handle.net/10251/50244
Elsevier
Hernández Orallo, J.; Dowe, DL.; Hernández Lloreda, MV. (2014). Universal
psychometrics: measuring cognitive abilities in the machine kingdom. Cognitive Systems
Research. 27:50-74. doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.06.001.
Universal Psychometrics:
Measuring Cognitive Abilities in the Machine Kingdom
Jose´ Herna´ndez-Oralloa,∗, David L. Doweb, M.Victoria Herna´ndez-Lloredac
aDSIC, Universitat Polite`cnica de Vale`ncia, Vale`ncia, Spain.
jorallo@dsic.upv.es
bComputer Science and Software Engineering, Clayton School of Information Technology
Monash University, Clayton, Vic. 3800, Australia.
david.dowe@infotech.monash.edu.au
cDepartamento de Metodolog´ıa de las Ciencias del Comportamiento, Universidad Complutense de Madrid,
Spain.
vhlloreda@psi.ucm.es
Abstract
We present and develop the notion of ‘universal psychometrics’ as a subject of study, and
eventually a discipline, that focusses on the measurement of cognitive abilities for the machine
kingdom, which comprises any (cognitive) system, individual or collective, either artificial,
biological or hybrid. Universal psychometrics can be built, of course, upon the experience,
techniques and methodologies from (human) psychometrics, comparative cognition and re-
lated areas. Conversely, the perspective and techniques which are being developed in the area
of machine intelligence measurement using (algorithmic) information theory can be of much
broader applicability and implication outside artificial intelligence. This general approach
to universal psychometrics spurs the re-understanding of most (if not all) of the big issues
about the measurement of cognitive abilities, and creates a new foundation for (re)defining
and mathematically formalising the concept of cognitive task, evaluable subject, interface,
task choice, difficulty, agent response curves, etc. We introduce the notion of a universal
cognitive test and discuss whether (and when) it may be necessary for exploring the machine
kingdom. On the issue of intelligence and very general abilities, we also get some results and
connections with the related notions of no-free-lunch theorems and universal priors.
Keywords: cognitive system evaluation; psychometrics; cognitive abilities; artificial in-
telligence; algorithmic information theory
1. Introduction
The measurement of intelligence and other cognitive abilities is the subject of several
disciplines. On one hand, psychometrics has developed valid and reliable tests for human
intelligence and related abilities. On the other hand, comparative psychology (and cognition)
has explored animal behaviour and the range of cognitive abilities for many different species.
∗Corresponding author. Address: “DSIC, Universitat Polite`cnica de Vale`ncia, Camı´ de Vera s/n, 46022
Vale`ncia, Spain”, Phone: +34 96 3877007 Ext.: 73585, Fax: +34 96 3877359
Preprint submitted to Cognitive Systems Research June 16, 2013
While psychometrics and comparative psychology usually work independently, there are
areas and approaches where their connection becomes more explictly, such as evolutionary
psychology, the analysis of the personality of animals (Gosling, 2001) and the studies of
comparative cognition on apes (Herrmann et al., 2007, 2010). As a result, there is nowadays
a less anthropocentric view of human and animal abilities. Nonetheless, when we widen the
scope from humans to a range of species, some fundamental questions about the nature of
intelligence become more difficult: what intelligence really is, exactly what cognitive tests
measure, which factors there are and whether the relations among cognitive abilities are
only valid for a few species or general for the entire animal kingdom. Despite the enormous
progress in the past decades, comparative cognition, psychometrics and related disciplines
are still very far from drawing a comprehensive and accurate chart of the set of cognitive
abilities in the animal kingdom (including humans) and the degree to which each is present
in each species (and in each stage of development).
If this is already a vast sea for exploration, there is an uncharted ocean of cosmic dimen-
sion: the set of all possible machines, with any conceivable (computable) behaviour. We call
this set the machine kingdom. Any computable behaviour is possible —at least in theory—,
including the emulation of any animal (an animat, Wilson, 1991; Webb, 2009). While the
diversity and richness of behaviour is still much higher in natural systems than state-of-the-
art artificial systems, machines can be designed (or conceived of) without any constraint
related to evolution niches and species survival. Actually, computer systems are becoming
more and more complex and unpredictable (Bullock & Cliff, 2004). This is not different
for robots and other cognitive systems in artificial intelligence (AI), as some properties may
emerge as the result of a learning process in an environment or as the outcome of some kind
of artificial evolution. This suggests that there is an increasing need of tools for evaluating
the behaviour (e.g., the abilities) of all these artefacts.
Given this need, do we have a well-founded and functional set of cognitive tests for bots,
robots, artificial agents, avatars, ‘animats’, etc.? There are certainly many anthropocentric
approaches, such as the the Turing Test and variants (Turing, 1950; Oppy & Dowe, 2011),
the more recent CAPTCHAs (von Ahn et al., 2004) and the mere use of human IQ tests for
machines (Sanghi & Dowe, 2003; Detterman, 2011; Dowe & Herna´ndez-Orallo, 2012). We
will review some of these works in subsequent sections and discuss their limitations. There is
also an incipient line of research where algorithmic information theory plays a crucial role, as
we will see. Despite this more mathematical approach, the evaluation of artificial cognitive
systems is still much more immature than the evaluation of natural cognitive systems in
psychometrics, comparative psychology and ethology.
In this paper we claim that the statement of a more general problem, the measurement
of cognitive abilities for any kind of individual or collective —either artificial, biological or
hybrid— may be advantageous over the particular problems dealt with separately by human
psychometrics, animal evaluation and AI metrics. Thus, we propose here the notion of
‘universal psychometrics’ as a subject of study, and eventually a discipline, that would focus
on the measurement of any interactive (cognitive) system. In this spirit, and with the general
view of the machine kingdom, this paper re-explores and, in most cases, mathematically
formalises the concept of cognitive ability, evaluable subject, task choice, interface, difficulty,
factorisation, cognitive test, administration, scales, etc. One of the key concepts is the
definition of cognitive task class, as a weighting (more formally a distribution or probability
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measure) of tasks. This is useful to see what a cognitive ability can and, most especially,
cannot be, by using some results about task distributions, the no-free-lunch theorems and
the universal distributions.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes how the area of analysis has been
enlarged from human evaluation to animal evaluation, with a natural further generalisation
in the realm of machines, known as the machine kingdom. We define what an evaluable
subject in the machine kingdom is and we give a definition of universal psychometrics. Sec-
tion 3 overviews the different approaches taken in human psychometrics, animal evaluation
in comparative cognition and machine evaluation. Section 4 focusses on what is being mea-
sured, properly defining the notion of cognitive task and interface between a subject and a
task. Here we also develop the notion of task class and distribution, provide some examples
and deal with the notion of task difficulty. Section 5 discusses how expected performance
can be approximated for a task class, discusses some other possible indicators and shows
decompositions and curves based on difficulty. Section 6 focusses on the exploration of the
machine kingdom, introducing a general adaptive test, the use of populations or reference
machines for scaling, and the notion of universal test. Section 7 investigates how the space
of abilities can be explored around the concepts of validity and the analysis of relations and
hierarchies among abilities. It touches upon the notion of general ability and intelligence,
and its connections with the so-called no-free-lunch theorems and related results. Section 8
closes the paper with a discussion about the possible objections to universal psychometrics,
its possibilities and applicability, and the main contributions of this work.
2. On evaluable subjects: the Machine Kingdom
One of the most important contributions that science makes in many disciplines is the
categorisation and classification of phenomena, from rocks to planets, from subatomic parti-
cles to plants, etc. Having a good account, a taxonomy, of what we have is linked to the more
difficult question of analysing the laws that govern these things. The first thing to do in any
discipline is then to define this “universe” of subjects1 and try to introduce a taxonomy for
them.
If we are dealing with measuring cognitive abilities, we need to define precisely what
systems can be measured and what abilities can be measured. Next we deal with the subjects.
In section 4, we will deal with the abilities.
2.1. The Machine Kingdom
When dealing with the subjects of study —of evaluation, in this case—, we typically
encounter a highly fragmented view of the disciplines and procedures depending on the kind
of subject —humans, non-human animals2 and non-biological machines—, as seen in figure 1.
1If universal psychometrics aims to be truly universal, any kind of cognitive system could be a possible
subject to be evaluated. We will be as broad as possible, including humans, other living beings, machines,
either on Earth or elsewhere, hybrids of any of these (such as humans augmented by objects and devices),
and of course groups or communities of these, and the inter-connection (or communication) protocols making
them work as a group.
2In what follows, we use the term ‘animal’ but we do not exclude, in principle, other living organisms,
such as plants or fungi.
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Humans
Psychometrics
Animals
Animal 
Cognition
Machines
?
Figure 1: Human, animal and machine intelligence are considered separately.
Homo sapiens
Psychometrics, comparative cognition, 
genetic psychology, ethology, ...
Animals Machines
?
Figure 2: Current view as human intelligence is more and more frequently seen in the context of animal
intelligence. Machine intelligence is still considered separately.
The previous picture is simplistic in many ways, since there is an increasing overlap between
psychometrics and comparative cognition and ethology, and human and animal cognition in
general. The picture has a more accurate representation at present as shown in figure 2.
This view is increasingly more popular3 in comparative cognition (see, e.g., Herrmann et al.,
2007, 2010).
Of course, if we see the move from figure 1 to figure 2, it is natural to expect that
the worlds of animals and machines could also be integrated in some way. In fact, many
theories of cognition are full of computational models, and the metaphor of the computer for
humans and non-human animals is already a tradition in many cognitive sciences. However,
by integration we mean something more than establishing some parallels. For instance, the
area of artificial life and some fields in the area of adaptive behaviour try to reproduce the
structures of the left of figures 1 and 2 on their right. The notion of animat (Wilson, 1991;
Webb, 2009) is the most representative and clear example of this parallel. With this parallel,
robotic androids (humanoids) would just be special cases of the concept of animat (see, e.g.,
Di Paolo, August 2009).
Is this dualistic view with animats in a virtual world and animals in the physical world
the right picture? We think it is not. The existence of robots in the physical world and
people in virtual worlds (Internet, games, etc.) makes this separate scenario unsound and
unrealistic. Furthermore, the previous picture is problematic in many ways. What about a
human who is assisted with a non-electronic or (possibly) electronic device (or both) —or
3The issue of Homo sapiens being contained within the animal kingdom is one which most —but surely
not all— are totally happy with, even though there is overwhelming evidence since Alfred Russel Wallace
and Charles R. Darwin were to advance this.
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Homo sapiens
Animal Kingdom
Machine Kingdom
Universal Psychometrics
Figure 3: The view of the realm of evaluable agents for universal psychometrics.
a collective of humans, animals and machines? Where do we put them? Which technique
should we use to evaluate them?
The key issue about a proper integration is simply the well-known Church-Turing the-
sis. If this thesis is assumed, everything that is effectively computable is computable by a
Turing machine (or any equivalent computing formalism). This thesis is almost universally
accepted. The leap comes when we apply this thesis to animals, or, more properly, we apply
the physical Church-Turing thesis. The physical Church-Turing thesis states that “every
finitely realizable physical system can be perfectly simulated by a universal model comput-
ing machine operating by finite means” (Deutsch, 1985), i.e., a resource-bounded Turing
machine4.
This is compatible with considering animals non-deterministic, since physical machines
can be made non-deterministic by any external (physical) source of randomness, such as
physically random number generators (Wallace, 1990; Brent, 2008). On some occasions, we
explain with non-determinism some effects which can easily be explained with deterministic
machines. For instance, for deterministic machines, it is virtually impossible in practice
to know their behaviour into the future (because of chaotic effects and also because these
machines interact with the real world).
According to all this, the picture simplifies extremely, as shown in figure 3. Biological
and robotic systems are in the machine kingdom as well as animats and other kinds of virtual
agents in virtual environments, hybrids or collectives, provided they are bound to a physical
mechanism (electronic, molecular or other).
The best way to see exactly what objects compose the machine kingdom is by intro-
ducing a formal definition of interactive system. One of the most general, powerful (and
elaborate) models of interactive processes is said to be continuous-time, continuous-state
and continuous-action Partially-Observable Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). We can
even generalise this by considering any possible domain set for time, states5, observations
and actions.
Definition 1. An interactive system is defined as a tuple 〈T ,S,O, I, s˙, o˙〉, where T is the
time space, S is the state space, O is the output space, I is the input space, s˙(s, i) is a
4This leap is not universally accepted, with many arguable reasons against (chaos theory, quantum
computations, incomputability of the mind, etc.).
5Using an appropriately (infinite) state domain, any process which does not follow the Markov property
can still be modelled, since the state can be used as memory and ∆S as partial updates to that memory.
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transition rate function: S × I → ∆S, and o˙(s, i) is an output function: S × I → O.
An interactive system can be non-deterministic (e.g., functions s˙ and o˙ can be non-
deterministic). Interactive systems are usually referred to as ‘agents’, and outputs are called
actions, and inputs are called perceptions or observations.
As we have discussed above, we will only work with (physically) computable agents. It
is easy to define appropriate sets for time, states, outputs and inputs such that agents are
computable. More precisely, we can use recursively enumerable sets such as Σ = B∗, where
B = {0, 1}, i.e. Σ is the set of (possibly empty) binary strings, and the set of rational
numbers (denoted by Q). From here, we can use a discrete time6 in T = Q (instead of the
set of real numbers, R). The other spaces could be defined similarly: S = Σ, O = Σ and
I = Σ, or restricted to finite sets.
Definition 2. The machine kingdom (denoted by Ω), is the set of all physically7 computable
interactive systems (or agents).
The notion of machine kingdom makes some recent works in comparative cognition,
adaptive behaviour and robotics more meaningful. For instance, in (Barrera et al., 2011),
rats and a specific kind of robot are compared on the same tasks, as if they were two different
species. These kinds of comparisons between animals and animats will be more and more
common in the near future.
The integrated view helps us realise that even though we already knew that the diversity
of the animal kingdom is enormous, the diversity of the machine kingdom appears to be
unlimited.
2.2. Definition of Universal Psychometrics
The character, size and diversity of the set defined by definition 2 prompts a new field of
study, known as universal psychometrics, which is defined as follows:
Definition 3. Universal Psychometrics is the analysis and development of measurement
techniques and tools for the evaluation of cognitive abilities8 of subjects in the machine
kingdom.
6For the physical world, it might make more sense to (e.g.) have multiples of Planck time using N.
However, since seconds are more customary, we will use Q.
7Elements in the machine kingdom are not abstract things, but physically-realisable things. The condition
of being physically computable is formally stricter than being computable, since it assumes some kind of
resource bounds on computation, as the physical Church-Turing thesis does. Similarly, it also entails a
stricter definition than being recursively enumerable, namely being computably enumerable with physical
resources. A similar appreciation can be made about all the domain sets which compose an interactive
system. This means that the set of all agents, i.e., the machine kingdom Ω, is a recursively enumerable
set with physical resources. We could define the machine kingdom in a more general way, by considering
any conceivable machine, physically realisable or not, or several models of ‘hypercomputation’ (Syropoulos,
2008). We could also do this with the notion of cognitive ability, which will be seen in section 4. Technically,
this would lead to a more general (or completely universal) notion of universal psychometrics, and could
also dissipate some concerns about the animal kingdom being included in the machine kingdom (as defined
here), possibly related to the famous Lucas/Penrose argument. This eventual generalisation is appealing,
but we prefer to consider a more restrictive (but already huge) setting, at least for the rest of this paper.
8Other traits related to personality or emotions are also possible. We exclude them here for simplicity.
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The definition depends on a proper definition of cognitive ability that we will see in
section 4, but we can understand cognitive abilities constructed over sets of measurable
information-processing tasks. Abilities such as playing basketball well or having a good
pronunciation are not purely information-processing processes, since they rely on physical
abilities. On the contrary, playing chess well and being able to do written-text translation
are (almost) purely cognitive abilities.
Note that the traditional notion of subject in the animal kingdom considers that an
individual is usually seen as a single entity throughout its life, even though its cognitive
development may give different measurements at different periods in life (e.g., from childhood
to adulthood, or after an accident or illness). In the generalised case of the ‘machine kingdom’
this is more complex since, e.g., we can migrate an AI system to a faster machine, with some
of its abilities immediately being improved, while still being the same ‘algorithm’. As for
definition 2, a subject is a program in a physical machine, so any (small) change to the
program or to the machine (including, e.g., learning) makes it —technically— a different
subject9. The definition implies that abilities related to speed can be perfectly measured
(since we have not used the notion of asynchronous interactive discrete-time systems, but a
more general setting in definition 2). And, of course, we will still be able to define tasks and
abilities for which time is not taken into account.
Another issue related to measurement is the generality of definition 2. We cannot expect
that subjects in Ω must necessarily be “agents with goals” or that there must be a way to
condition their actions. In some cases, this will be possible, but in some others we will not
discover a way to do that, or it may simply be impossible. This highlights the relevance of
the interface between a subject and a task, which is more important the more diverse the
population we want to analyse is. We will introduce proper definitions of interface and task
in subsequent sections.
There are many (more) issues when trying to evaluate subjects in the machine kingdom.
We will deal with many of them in this paper. Before getting into more details, the very
(simple) idea of universal psychometrics helps to show that some techniques concerning mea-
suring cognitive abilities have been derived in a very specific way (e.g., human psychometrics)
but can be used in a more general way if properly generalised (e.g., computerised adaptive
testing, use of rewards, etc.). It would be good to bring all the knowledge, techniques and
experience of psychometrics and comparative cognition for the corresponding measurement
of the (broader) machine kingdom. Similarly, there is also an important flow that could be
taken from the general approach recently blossoming in machine evaluation to human and
non-human animal evaluation, such as the derivation of task difficulty, the use of formal def-
initions and tests of intelligence, etc. All these techniques from different fields are reviewed
in the following section.
9This has to be much more explicit for machines in general than for animals, since for animals —and
humans in particular— their cognitive abilities are assumed to be relatively constant in two different (but
reasonably close) periods of time, especially when we refer to fluid —versus crystallised— abilities. For
machines we do not know how much their program can change in a very short period of time, so we have to
be more careful when assuming that fluid abilities for the same machine remain constant at different times
(or even during an experiment). This is related to the notion of potential intelligence we will discuss in
section 6.4.
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3. Background
Once we have clarified the realm of subjects we want to measure, we need to analyse
the theories, techniques and methodologies which have been used in each parcel, with a
special emphasis on those which might be still applicable and more useful for universal
psychometrics.
3.1. Evaluating humans
Humans have been evaluated by other humans in all periods of history, but it is not until
the 20th century that psychometrics was established as a scientific discipline. Psychometrics
not only measures abilities (cognitive skills), but also traits (personality) and attitudes (social
views and opinions). In this paper we will focus on the measurement of cognitive abilities.
Regarding cognitive abilities, psychometrics developed the crucial distinction between
“culture-fair” versus “culture-bound” tests, and the notions of “fluid abilities” versus “crys-
tallised abilities” (see, e.g., Sternberg, 2000; Eysenck, 2007). Thorndike’s theory (1927)
introduced a distinction between the width which is attained on a certain level of difficulty
(e.g., the percentage of tasks at this level which are correctly solved) and the altitude (the
highest difficulty a subject can reach, setting a minimum width threshold). From these
two concepts, an aggregate performance result was obtained, called “area” by Thorndike.
Although these terms are not so common nowadays, similar ideas still prevail.
Among all the tests developed in psychometrics, intelligence tests, and, most especially,
IQ tests have become the most popular and useful, but also the most controversial. Some of
the objections are about the very nature of IQ tests. For instance, many philosophers (and
some psychometricians) have raised the “subjectivity objection” of the items in IQ tests.
This objection says that there is no intrinsic or mathematical reason to choose some of the
“correct” answers. Why is 9 the follower of 1, 3, 5, 7? Why not 1 again? Many IQ tests
series, progressive matrices, etc., require a “correct” answer. Even though this is related to
the inductive inference problem (Solomonoff, 1996; Herna´ndez-Orallo, 2000c)(Dowe, 2008,
footnote 128), this objection has not been properly solved in psychometrics. One of the
answers which is given is that if the “correct” answer is “explained”, most humans agree
that this is reasonable. However, by mere human agreement we cannot explain why some
other, alternative, explanations can be ruled out.
The set of abilities measured by psychometrics and social sciences is endless. A different
question is whether abilities or traits are independent or not. Note that the correlations
refer to the species (or any subpopulation, according to age, sex, race, country, etc). When
we focus on cognitive abilities, and, more specifically, on the intellect, the relations between
abilities are more difficult to analyse. In the case of intelligence, for instance, there is no
consensus about how many factors there are and how they should be arranged. This also
depends on the theory or structure of (human) intellect being advocated. This is different
for each different theory: Spearman-Thurstone, Eysenck, Piaget, Jensen, .... Despite the
differences, the most prominent distinctive factors are usually a small set, such as inductive
reasoning, deductive reasoning, verbal ability, numerical ability, spatial ability, perceptual
speed, rote memory and perceptual organisation (Eysenck, 2007). Some other ‘factors’ or
abilities have been appearing and have been a source of long debates, such as the “inspection
time” (Sternberg, 2000, chap. 13), which is a very simple information processing ability,
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which strongly correlates with some measures of intelligence, in humans. This raises the
question of what correlation between abilities really means in humans (or other species),
since “inspection time” is clearly different from intelligence, as eyes and hair are different
but their colour is related.
Decades of research have not led to convergence of theoretical views. Measuring and
understanding intelligence in psychometrics have been governed by factor analysis approaches
during decades. Unidimensional and multiple factor theories of intelligence derived from its
application, as early as Spearman’s two-factor theory of intelligence (Spearman, 1904) —
where performance in intelligence tests is the results of the operation of a general factor (g)
and specific factors (s) due to unique abilities related to particular tests. Many multiple
factor theories followed, such as the one proposed by Kelly (1928), Thurstone’s theory of
primary mental abilities (Thurstone, 1938), Guilford’s three-facet model of the structure of
intellect (Guilford, 1967), hierarchical models such as Vernon’s and Burt’s (Vernon, 1950;
Burt, 1949), the hierarchical structure proposed as well by Cattell and Horn (see, e.g., Horn &
Cattell, 1967) —with g divided into fluid intelligence (gf) and crystallised intelligence (gc)—
and the most recent three-stratum theory of intelligence proposed by Carroll (1993) —with a
general factor in Stratum 3. Most IQ tests widely used derived from these models/theories,
derived in turn from factor analysis approaches. Some of them are most directly related
to a general factor model of intelligence, such as Raven’s Progressive Matrices Tests (Raven
et al., 1992), and Wechsler scales (e.g., WAIS-R, Wechsler, 1981), while others are associated
with the multiple factor theories, such as Thurstone’s Primary Mental Abilities Test and the
updated Schaie-Thurstone Adult Mental Abilities Test (Schaie, 1985).
Distinct theories have also been proposed for psychological measurement that differ in the
way they conceptualise the measurement process. Two of the most important measurement
models are Classical Test Theory and Item Response Theory (CTT and IRT respectively
henceforth). CTT is still the most influential and widely used in empirical application (chiefly
in psychology). The central point of CTT is the concept of “true score” that is conceptualised
as the expected value of the observed score. In this respect, Boring’s “intelligence is what
intelligence tests measure” applies perfectly to this model since, for CTT, someone’s intel-
ligence is her expected score on an IQ-test. Some have criticised this approach (Borsboom,
2005), arguing that the underlying philosophy is an ambiguous operationalism in which the
meaning of theoretical attributes and the operations and instruments used to measure them
are the same thing.
The more recent IRT approach (e.g., Rasch, 1960) is challenging in this respect and
supposes an advance in the field. IRT, or latent variable model, is more popular in the
academic arena and psychometric research. Based on a realistic philosophy, traits or theo-
retical attributes are treated as latent variables and are conceptualised as the common cause
of observed variables. From this approach, for example, intelligence is seen as the common
cause of the responses to a particular IQ test (or intelligence item). An observed score on
an IQ test is conceived as a particular measure, index of the latent variable, intelligence (as
far as the statistical model, based on the theory of the latent variable, fits the data). One
popular IRT model is the three parameter model (see, e.g., Lord et al., 1968):
P (θ) = c+
1− c
1 + e−a(θ−b)
(1)
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which, based on a logistic function, estimates the probability of guessing the item right
according to a level θ of proficiency or ability, where parameter a is the discriminative power
of the item, b is its difficulty, and c is the binomial floor on the probability of getting an item
correct. Parameters a and b are usually inferred experimentally, using a (sub)population as
a reference. This is important, since IRT is frequently referred to as a “formal” and “well-
founded” way of choosing test items. This does not mean, however, that items and their
difficulty are obtained from theoretical principles, but rather that a well-founded theory
is used to empirically estimate their parameters. A few recent models following the IRT
approach can include parameters to describe the cognitive demand of the items (such as the
‘Confirmatory IRT Models’ in (Sternberg, 2000, chap. 19)). This has important theoretical
implications since the model provides (at least partial) information about what is measured
by the items, being therefore better interfaced with cognitive psychological approaches to
understanding intelligence.
Computerised Adaptive Testing (CAT) (Wainer, 2000; Weiss, 2011) usually relies on IRT
to develop adaptive tests which select the most informative items according to the results
on previous items. Adaptive tests are usually more efficient than classical ones, especially
when the ability range of the examinee is unknown in advance. However, CAT tests require
an accurate estimation of IRT parameters.
Another important concept is the distinction between reliability and validity. Basically,
reliability refers to the precision of a measure, that is, the degree to which a measure is
error-free (and whether the ability is consistently measured for the same individual in differ-
ent moments, e.g., test-retest estimation). In estimating reliability, different measurement
models use different approaches (Sternberg, 2000; Rasch, 1960; Embretson & Reise, 2000,
chap. 19-21). In CTT, we have different procedures (e.g., test-retest, parallel forms, internal
consistency, etc.) and each one of them tells us about different sources of error (e.g., tem-
poral stability, degree of parallelism, sampling error, ...). In IRT, “information functions”
are also used to describe the degree of precision of a test at different levels of the estimated
ability (or trait). On the other hand, validity is not easy to define. While the concept has
evolved significantly (see, e.g., AERA, APA & NCME, 1999; Borsboom et al., 2004), for the
rest of the paper we will stick to the traditional (and still popular) concept: “a test is valid
if it measures what it is supposed to be measuring” (Kelley, 1927).
Summing up, there are many caveats and objections about psychometrics, but it is widely
recognised that psychometrics is able to measure human intelligence and cognitive abilities
accurately. The widespread use of psychometrics in education, psychology, psychiatry and
human resource selection is still one of the best corroborations of the success of psychometrics.
3.2. Evaluating non-human animals
In a sense, the foundation of animal cognition research has it roots in Charles Darwin’s
and Alfred Russel Wallace’s ideas. Their still controversial hypothesis that humans’ and
other animals’ minds differ just in degree and not in kind still remains as a hot topic in
the field. Since the beginning, comparative psychology has focussed in cognitive differences
between species. The first studies (e.g., Harlow et al., 1950; Bitterman, 1960) positioned
within the framework of scala naturae, focussed in searching for universal laws of learning.
Behaviourism pushed comparative cognition towards general models of cognition (e.g.,
Skinner, 1938; Watson, 1967) and focussed on a very few species, with the white rat as the
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main subject of study (see MacLean et al., 2011), with less emphasis on species comparison
(Shettleworth’s paper “Where is the comparison in comparative cognition?”, 1993). The
last three decades have brought an important evolution in the field (Griffin, 1978). The
number of studied species increased significantly and the scope shifted toward other animals,
with apes, monkeys, and humans as the most popular ones. This trend was accused of
“chimpocentrism” (Beck, 1982), since many studies focussed on apes, but today the spectrum
has been widened significantly in the animal kingdom: mammals (cetaceans, dogs, elephants,
...), other vertebrates (birds, fish) and even invertebrates (bees, ants, octopuses, ...). All this
is shedding light about convergence and divergence phenomena in the evolution of cognition
(Shettleworth, 2009, 2010).
Today, the study of cognition comprises the study of the animal mechanisms for acquir-
ing, processing, storing and acting on information available in the environment. Following
(Tomasello & Call, 1997), comparative cognitive studies encompass processes (of acquisi-
tion, representation and behavioural control) related to two main domains defined in terms
of what aspect of the world they are about: physical and social cognition. The study of the
cognition of time, space, numbers, causal reasoning and tools use are typically in the physical
cognition domain while processes such as social learning, theory of mind and communication
are within the social domain.
There is an important difference between the study of cognitive abilities in human psycho-
metrics and animals. Human abilities are usually linked to the success and performance in
some (specific) contexts in life (e.g., academic performance and highly-qualified jobs). From
the point of view of animal cognition, cognitive abilities and, of course, intelligence are seen
from an evolutionary point of view in terms of environments and ecosystems. For instance,
if a species has more long-term memory or a shorter response time, its individuals may be
more fitted to capture prey and to identify and escape from predators. All this suggests a
complex relation between survival, reproduction, fitness and some cognitive abilities.
For universal psychometrics, the part of animal cognition which is most relevant is the one
which comprises the techniques and methodologies which have been devised for evaluating
animals. Animal testing is much more difficult than (adult) human testing. The reasons are
clear: it is more difficult to give instructions to animals or to coerce them to do something, to
keep their attention, etc. This also happens with human testing as well, most especially with
children and people with disabilities. The answer for this is typically the use of rewarding
protocols, which in the case of animals means some kind of delicatessen.
On many occasions, we have seen that the interface is crucial. If we use the wrong
food as a reward for an animal, its performance will be underestimated. This raises a very
important point in measurement (and also in universal psychometrics): given a task, the
result on a task may be underestimated with a bad interface design. It is frequently argued
that the poor scores of some animals (or even people) at some tasks are explained by a bad
interface design. The reasons are not always easy to spot, since the subject may not like the
rewards as much as the tester thought, the subject may want to mock or dupe the tester or
feel suspicious about her, the subject may want to use the test to communicate something
with the tester, or even, the subject may want to test the tester (Solomonoff, 1967, sec. 6,
The Problem of the Ambitious Subordinate). A bad interface design might also cause the
test to overestimate, because it may give more information than needed, or it may give the
information in an unfairly advantageous way. On other occasions, the task which is being
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evaluated might require another ability which is taken for granted, but is only present in one
species but not in others.
Although difficult, evaluating different species in a fair way is still at least largely possible,
if done carefully. An example of how different species can be evaluated, one of them being
human children, while aiming at discovering the effect of social abilities, can be found here
(Herrmann et al., 2007). In this work, the exercises are the same but the interfaces are
different, including different rewards for each kind of subject.
A final issue for which animal testing is pioneering as well is in the measurement of
collectives. There are studies evaluating ant colonies, bee swarms, and other animal flocks
(see, e.g., Strassmann et al., 1997). In these cases the subject is the group, and not the
individual. This obliges us to find suitable interfaces, as well as appropriate rewarding and
scoring mechanisms, since some individuals might even die during the test as a useful sacrifice
for the common ‘goal’. This is related as well to the measurement of social abilities.
3.3. Evaluation in Artificial Intelligence
Both psychometrics and comparative psychology are based on the notion of ‘species’.
While psychometrics evaluates individuals by placing them in normalised scales which are
derived from the human population, comparative psychology typically extrapolates the cog-
nitive abilities of a species from some testing on a sample of individuals of that species. In
other words, psychometrics focusses on the evaluation of individual differences while com-
parative cognition generally focusses on the evaluation of differences between species. There
are, however, some exceptions, such as (Herrmann et al., 2010), which evaluates individual
differences in more than one species.
Things are different for machines. We can say that two machines are identical, or talk
about a “series” of machines with similar characteristics (according to their design), but
certainly no notion of species which compare or normalise. An interactive machine can be
any computable process, for which even the notion of ‘individual’ is different.
When talking about tests for machines, we need to start with the Turing Test (originally,
the imitation game, Turing, 1950) and its many variations (Oppy & Dowe, 2011). In the
previous section, we have seen how comparative cognition works. The Turing test tries to
put systems in equivalence classes by comparing two different kinds of individuals. In fact,
it compares an individual with a species (with one human as a sample). In a way, it is a very
special (and rudimentary) kind of comparative test, which could be a very nice experiment
in comparative psychology. For instance, how much time does a committee of judges need
to tell a bonobo from a chimpanzee (using a teletype communication)? While this might
be insightful as an imaginary experiment, nobody is currently doing these kinds of things in
practical animal cognition. We must say otherwise in AI, since some people still do think
that the Turing Test (or some of its variants) is a good test or even a practical test. It is
primarily just a test of humanity, with human judges, but fairly useless for determining and
measuring different cognitive abilities.
A related idea for comparing (or telling apart) two different kinds of systems is the notion
of CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans
Apart, von Ahn et al., 2004), which poses extremely discriminative exercises that are easy
for humans but not achievable with current computer technology. These kinds of tests are
very useful in real applications but they do not really evaluate cognitive abilities in general.
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CAPTCHAs are also ‘cracked’ regularly, and they need to be replaced by more sophisticated
ones, which are currently becoming difficult for humans, thus losing discriminative power.
Apart from these comparative approaches, there are some (although not too many Long
& Fox, 2003; Genesereth et al., 2005; Whiteson et al., 2010) specific tests and competitions
which have been proposed (and some still running) in the field of AI. All of them, however,
are just constructed as a set of specific tasks (learning, planning, robotics, games, ...) and
not meant to evaluate general individuals (only individuals conceived for that task). Many of
these competitions modify and extend the set of tasks each year in order to cover a broader
view of the field and avoid competition-specialisation. However, the ‘difficulty’ of each task is
always quantified or estimated in an informal or ad-hoc way, so it is very difficult to compare
results across different algorithms and competitions.
An exceptional area in artificial intelligence where evaluation practices are closer to the
kind of evaluation performed in comparative cognition is Reinforcement Learning (RL) (Sut-
ton & Barto, 1998; Woergoetter & Porr, 2008). RL is a proper and general setting for defining
and analysing learning agents which interact with an environment through the use of ob-
servations, actions and rewards. Hence, RL is not strictly limited to AI agents; non-human
animals and humans can be understood in this setting, most especially in the context of eval-
uation. In fact, the theory of reinforcement learning is now overlapping with areas dealing
with adaptive behaviour and cognition in general. One important (and, at the same time,
complex) idea in RL is how rewards are aggregated, as well as the problem of exploration-
exploitation, which is usually solved by the use of discounted reward utility functions or other
aggregated functions of performance (Herna´ndez-Orallo, 2010). The tests in these areas are
generally focussed on specific tasks, as in the rest of AI. However, tasks are not predefined
but also learned through rewards, as happens with animal testing. Nonetheless, the goal in
animal testing is not always to make the animal learn to do something, but to discover the
natural cognitive way to proceed.
A straightforward but very different idea for evaluating machines is the use of IQ tests
(or, more generally, human intelligence tests and tests of other cognitive abilities). This has
been indirectly suggested many times in AI, especially in its beginning. For instance, Evans
(1964) cracked some exercises similar to IQ tests using his program ANALOGY. The goal of
this line of research was set by Newell (1973): “to construct a single program that would take
a standard intelligence test”. Recently, this approach has been “resurrected” (Bringsjord,
2011) under the name “Psychometric AI” (Bringsjord & Schimanski, 2003; Bringsjord, 2011),
which first states that“some agent is intelligent if and only if it excels at all10 established,
validated tests of intelligence” (Bringsjord, 2011) and, second, defines “psychometric AI [as]
the field devoted to building [these agents]” (Bringsjord, 2011). Remarkably, this is not
“AI psychometrics”, which would be the field devoted to evaluating these agents. While
“psychometric AI” may commendably revive the relation between psychometrics and AI, it
reproduces the old circularity in psychometrics: “intelligence is what the intelligence tests
measure”. Ultimately, the selection of “all established, validated tests of intelligence and
mental ability, [...], tests of artistic and literary creativity, mechanical ability, and so on”
(Bringsjord, 2011) relies on an agreement of what an ‘established, validated test’ is and a
10Emphasis is ours.
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selection among “the myriad tests that psychometricians have validated” (Bringsjord & Schi-
manski, 2003). A similar route is traced by Douglas K. Detterman, editor of the Intelligence
journal, who recently announced (Detterman, 2011) a challenge (originally to Watson, the
AI winner of the Jeopardy! TV quiz show), suggesting the use of IQ tests to evaluate the
whole field of artificial intelligence. Since a program passing a single psychometric test does
not mean that the program is intelligent (emphatically shown in (Sanghi & Dowe, 2003)),
the goal seems then to be redefined as passing a whole battery of tests. This (and psycho-
metric AI) conceals the fact that a set or battery of tests is just a larger (possibly more
heterogeneous) test.
We think that the perspective of universal psychometrics we shape in this paper gives
some clues as to why the above-mentioned paths are wrong. IQ tests (and many other
cognitive tests) are not for machines, at least not yet, as has been further elaborated in
(Dowe & Herna´ndez-Orallo, 2012). In fact, these tests, and many other psychometric tests
for other cognitive abilities are not (yet) even useful for animals. They can be used as an
ultimate goal, as an inspiration or even as a measure of progress in AI, but they cannot be
used, in the long term, as valid tests for universal psychometrics. The reason is that IQ
tests are —at least currently— anthropocentric. One problem is that they assume many
things about the evaluated subject. A second problem is that we do not know exactly what
these tests measure, since —in general— there is no formal theory or model behind how the
exercises are generated. Third, there is no general mathematical account of the difficulty
of exercises, apart from a normalisation to the human population. Fourth, it has been
shown that IQ tests can be fooled by machines11. All this does not mean that the (human)
psychometric approach is not useful to develop tests for machines, but that some principles
must be changed if the remaining available tools are to be preserved.
A different and principled approach started in the late 1990s, while its origins can be
traced back to Chaitin’s invitation to “develop formal definitions of intelligence and measures
of its various components [using algorithmic information theory]” (Chaitin, 1982, sec. 6, item
f). An induction-enhanced Turing Test was proposed (Dowe & Hajek, 1997, 1998) in such a
way that a general inductive ability can be indirectly measured by the test. The importance
was not that any kind of ability could be included in the Turing Test, but that this ability
could be formalised. This was done by defining inductive inference a` la MML (Wallace
& Boulton, 1968). The Minimum Message Length (MML) principle advocates for (two-
part) compression as a way to perform inductive inference (i.e., learning) and, ultimately,
intelligence (Wallace & Dowe, 1999; Wallace, 2005; Dowe, 2011, sec. 7.3). MML is closely
related to Solomonoff’s theory of prediction and Kolmogorov complexity (Wallace & Dowe,
1999; Li & Vita´nyi, 2008).
Independently, a new intelligence test (C-test) (Herna´ndez-Orallo & Minaya-Collado,
1998; Herna´ndez-Orallo, 2000a) was derived as sequence prediction problems which were gen-
11In particular, in 2003 a Perl computer program —with just 960 lines of code— performed quite well on
standard human IQ tests (Sanghi & Dowe, 2003), even surpassing the average score (of 100) on some tests.
The purpose of the experiment was not to show that this program was intelligent —or to make progress in
AI, as the psychometric AI approach vindicates— but to show that IQ tests were not for machines (Dowe
& Herna´ndez-Orallo, 2012). In fact, for every single new IQ test which is issued, a machine can be devised
to pass the “kind” of tasks which comprise the test, something which is also happening with CAPTCHAs.
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erated by a universal distribution (Solomonoff, 1964) and the related algorithmic information
theory (a.k.a. Kolmogorov complexity (Li & Vita´nyi, 2008) or Solomonoff-Kolmogorov com-
plexity). The C-tests estimated the intelligence of a subject (or, perhaps, more precisely, its
inductive inference ability) by using sequences whose complexity was mathematically derived
from constructs derived from Kolmogorov complexity. These exercises were very similar to
those found in some IQ tests, but here they were created from computational principles. In
fact, the test was administered to humans, and the results strongly correlated with some IQ
tests (Herna´ndez-Orallo & Minaya-Collado, 1998). For the authors, the test was taken as a
definition of intelligence. As a result, ‘intelligence’ was no longer (only) what the IQ tests
measure (Boring, 1923), but (also) a precise mathematical concept. In addition, this work
“solved” the traditional subjectivity objection of the items in IQ tests, i.e., since the continu-
ation of each sequence was derived from its shortest explanation, although this is still slightly
subjective relative to the reference machine used. However, this test only measured one cog-
nitive ability and its presentation was too narrow to be a general test. Consequently, these
ideas were extended to other cognitive abilities and other kinds of subjects in (Herna´ndez-
Orallo, 2000a) by the introduction of other ‘factors’, and the suggestion of using interactive
tasks where “rewards and penalties could be used instead”, as in reinforcement learning.
Similar ideas followed relating compression and intelligence. Compression tests were pro-
posed as a test for artificial intelligence (Mahoney, 1999), arguing that “optimal text com-
pression is a harder problem than artificial intelligence as defined by Turing’s”. Nonetheless,
the fact that there is a connection between compression and intelligence does not mean that
intelligence can be just defined as compression ability (see, e.g. Dowe et al., 2011 for a full
discussion on this).
(Dobrev, 2000, 2005) proposed a definition of (artificial) intelligence as an aggregate of
performance in a wide range of worlds, where the set of worlds is described by Turing ma-
chines and bounded by Kolmogorov complexity. Also, the agent with smallest Kolmogorov
complexity is said to be the best agent in this set of worlds. This agent, called “AI”, is
proposed to be found by a Levin search. Another approach following this trace is a refur-
bished notion of “universal intelligence”, formalised by (Legg & Hutter, 2007), also using
Kolmogorov complexity, Solomonoff’s universal distributions, and an aggregate of perfor-
mances in all the possible environments. However, several issues arise from here, such as
(e.g., see Herna´ndez-Orallo & Dowe, 2010, secs. 3.3 and 4) the apparent neglect of time, the
use of several sources of infiniteness and other counterintuitive consequences when trying to
derive a test from these ideas.
In (Herna´ndez-Orallo & Dowe, 2010), the problem was focussed back again to finding
good tests of machine intelligence, and to the notion of “universal intelligence test”, where
“universal” stands for any kind of subject. Some of the problems in previous approaches are
spotted, and solutions proposed. Also, this paper extends the notion of machine intelligence
test to adaptive scenarios, including time and adjusting the complexity of items to the
subject (instead of using a universal distribution for this). The notion of adaptive, anytime
intelligence test, was introduced, with clear similarities to Computerised Adaptive Testing
in psychometrics. Other notions such as the need for items to be discriminative, and a scale
of results where random agents are placed at 0, are firstly introduced in this work. This
paper also suggests that this setting could be used for any realm in AI, e.g. games, machine
learning, etc., which is a first step to reconcile the extreme fragmentation of AI subfields
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with a unified measuring setting. The setting has been used to develop preliminary tests
for both humans and machines (see, e.g., Insa-Cabrera et al., 2011; Herna´ndez-Orallo et al.,
2011), whose results show that there still remains a very long way ahead12.
4. On cognitive abilities
After the previous overview of related disciplines and ideas, we are ready to introduce one
of the main components of the definition of universal psychometrics: the notion of cognitive
ability.
Definition 4. A cognitive ability is a property of individuals in the machine kingdom Ω
which allows them to perform well in a selection of information-processing tasks.
This definition implies that abilities are constructs while tasks are instruments. Cognitive
abilities can be inferred by the performance on tasks —among other instruments— , but they
are not tasks themselves. In fact, it is very difficult (but arguably not impossible) to find
a set of tasks which corresponds uniquely with an ability, because a task usually involves
several abilities. We will discuss this later in the paper. For the moment, let us start with
the formalisation of task.
4.1. Cognitive task
An interesting duality of interaction is that tasks can also be seen as interactive processes
(see definition 1). In this case, inputs are known as actions and outputs are known as obser-
vations. There are many formalisms to define this kind of interactive processes, with, again,
(Partially-Observable) Markov Decision Processes (MDP) being very popular and general.
In many cases, discrete time, alternating interaction13, and finite states are assumed. In this
paper we are interested in the most general kind of processes. For instance, many percep-
tion abilities or control abilities cannot be (properly) modelled with a discrete, alternating
time. By ‘most general’, we mean environments such as those we are used to seeing in real
cognitive tasks, virtual problems or games (such as video games), where very general state,
action and observation domains can be used, and time is asynchronous (agents can perform
actions at any time). Such a general view is precisely definition 1, which can be used to
define the notion of cognitive task as follows:
Definition 5. A cognitive task is defined as a physically14 computable interactive system
〈T ,S,O, I, s˙, o˙〉 following definition 1 (with outputs being observations and inputs being ac-
12A test may work well for a given population or kind of subject, e.g., humans, such as psychometrics tests
or the C-tests (Herna´ndez-Orallo, 2000a), or, a family of reinforcement learning agents, such as (Insa-Cabrera
et al., 2011; Legg & Veness, 2011). However, the challenge of a universal test is really on its application to
different kinds of subjects (e.g., humans and machines) and observe whether the results represent a coherent
scale.
13By alternating interaction we mean that agent and environment alternate on their inputs and outputs,
as usual in discrete-time reinforcement learning.
14Again, we set the constraint of being physically constructible (computable), while it is true that some
problems, such as the decidability of the truth of any input first-order formula, could be a ‘task’. However,
these problems are undecidable and not constructible as a set of exercises (since we cannot know the answer
for all of them). Again, we do not discard that the notion of cognitive task could be further generalised, but
we stick to this simpler version for the rest of the paper.
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tions), and a score transition function u˙ : U × S ×O → ∆U , with U being a bounded set in
Q.
A cognitive task is then an interactive system with a score function u˙ over a domain of
scores U . Tasks can be non-deterministic (e.g. functions s˙, o˙, u˙ can be non-deterministic).
As we did for agents, the set of all tasks (denoted by M) is also assumed to be recursively
enumerable.
Given the previous definition, a couple of examples below will show how it can be used
to specify very different cognitive tasks. The first task we use for illustration is number
comparison. The goal is to compare two numbers (shown as panels with some of their lights
on) and select the greatest one, which is a common test for children and some animals (see,
e.g., Shettleworth, 2010). This is a one-exercise task, with no time-limit to answer:
Example 1. Consider the task ‘number comparison’ µnc defined with the following domains:
time T = Q, outputs O = 〈Bm,Bn〉, inputs I = {left, right,none}, scores U = {−1, 0, 1},
and states S = 〈{answered,waiting},Bm,Bn, {−1, 0, 1}〉 with the second and the third
terms in the tuple storing the numbers and the fourth term storing the score. The states15
evolve according to:
• s˙(〈waiting, x, y, e〉 ,none) = 〈waiting, x, y, e〉,
• s˙(〈waiting, x, y, e〉 , left) = 〈answered, x, y, e′〉, with x = 〈x(1), x(2), ..., x(m)〉 and y =〈
y(1), y(2), ..., y(n)
〉
, e′ = 1 if
∑m
i=1 x
(i) >
∑n
i=1 y
(i), e′ = −1 if ∑mi=1 x(i) <∑ni=1 y(i) and
e′ = 0 otherwise.
• s˙(〈waiting, x, y, e〉 , right) = 〈answered, x, y, e′〉, with x = 〈x(1), x(2), ..., x(m)〉 and
y =
〈
y(1), y(2), ..., y(n)
〉
, e′ = 1 if
∑m
i=1 x
(i) <
∑n
i=1 y
(i), e′ = −1 if ∑mi=1 x(i) >∑ni=1 y(i)
and e′ = 0 otherwise.
• s˙(〈answered, x, y, e〉 , a) = 〈answered, x, y, e〉 with a being any action.
where each x(i) (or y(i)) represents a light on the ‘panel’ x (respectively, y), and can be either
0 (off) or 1 (on)16. The observations in 〈Bm,Bn〉, where each argument represents a panel,
evolve according to:
• o˙(〈b, x, y, e〉 , a) = 〈x, y〉.
Score evolves as follows:
• u˙(u, 〈waiting, x, y, e〉 , z) = 0.
15States are quadruples here. For simplicity, the transition functions s˙ and u˙ are not expressed as differ-
ential equations or modifications (over ∆S or ∆U), but as regular functions (over S or U).
16This example uses a non-unique tuple-representation for numbers, so, e.g., for m = n = 5 we have
that 〈1, 0, 1, 1, 0〉 and 〈0, 0, 1, 1, 1〉 represent the same number, 3. This representation is much more culture
independent than a binary or decimal representation for numbers. In fact, when evaluating numerical abilities
with animals and children, this kind of representation (or a similar one, such as a cup or plate with a number
of items) is used.
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• u˙(u, 〈answered, x, y, e〉 , z) = e.
The initial state is randomly derived from 〈waiting, U({0, 1})m, U({0, 1})n, 0〉, which repre-
sents that both the left and the right panels switch its m and n lights according to a uniform
distribution U({0, 1}). Score is kept forever after the guess or answer. This task requires
us to set particular values for m and n, which also set how big the numbers that must be
compared can be.
The second example corresponds to a variation of a popular family of tasks in human
intelligence, the measurement of ‘reaction time’ to some stimulus or signal, which may or
may not require some reasoning. Here, we will formalise one of the simplest possibilities. A
signal (e.g., a light) is switched on at a random time or frequency. If the subject is able to
react quickly, it gets positive rewards. If the subject reacts too late (or before the light is
on) then rewards are negative. Scores and rewards are different things. Rewards are part of
the observations, working as indicators for the subject. In this example scores are calculated
as an aggregation of rewards, but this does not need to be so, in general. This example
is presented as a never-ending task, i.e., there are infinitely many attempts. In particular,
when the light is switched on and the reward is given, another exercise is proposed, and so
on indefinitely.
Example 2. Consider the task ‘reaction time’ µrt defined with the following domains: time T
= Q, outputs O = 〈{light-on, light-off},Q〉 with the second term of the observation meant
to be understood as a reward, inputs I = {press, release}, scores U = Q, and, again, states
are represented as tuples S = 〈{rewarding,no-rewarding},Q,Q〉, where the second and
third terms in the state tuple are used as time counters. The states evolve according to:
• s˙(〈no-rewarding, x, y〉 , release) = 〈no-rewarding, x− dt, 0〉,
• s˙(〈no-rewarding, x, y〉 ,press) = 〈rewarding, x− dt, τr〉,
• s˙(〈rewarding, x, y〉 , a) = 〈rewarding, x, y − dt〉, if y > 0
• s˙(〈rewarding, x, y〉 , a) = 〈no-rewarding, Exp(λ), 0〉, if y ≤ 0, with Exp being the
exponential distribution.
The observations evolve according to:
• o˙(〈no-rewarding, x, y〉 , a) = 〈light-on, 0〉 if x ≤ 0, and 〈light-off, 0〉 otherwise.
• o˙(〈rewarding, x, y〉 , a) = 〈light-on, 1
λ
− x〉 if x ≤ 0, and 〈light-off,− 1
λ
〉
otherwise.
Score evolves as a function of rewards (here, r, a part of the observations):
• u˙(u, s, 〈l, r〉) = u(t−dt)+r·dt
t
= u+ dt
t
(r − u)
The initial state is 〈no-rewarding, Exp(λ), 0〉 and the initial score u = 0. The values λ and
τr can be seen as parameters for the task. The first, λ, gauges the average time for signals.
For instance, if λ is set to 0.2, it means that the average time for a signal is 5 seconds.
The second parameter, τr sets the time the reward is active (and the game is temporarily
‘stopped’). For instance, it could be set to 1/(10λ) seconds. This would mean that the reward
is enabled for half a second. Note that the reward requires some duration, since the score
function can be seen as a normalised integral or sum of rewards so far.
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Figure 4: An example with two different agents and interfaces for the same environment.
4.2. Interfaces and episodes
Now that we have proper definitions for agents and tasks, we need to connect them. The
way to connect a task with an agent is through an interface:
Definition 6. Given a task µ = 〈Tµ,Sµ,Oµ, Iµ, s˙µ, o˙µ〉 and an agent pi =〈Tpi,Spi,Opi, Ipi, s˙pi, o˙pi〉,
an interface φ between them is a tuple of mappings 〈φT , φA, φZ〉, with φT : Tpi → Tµ being the
time mapping, φA : Opi → Iµ being the action mapping, φZ : Ipi → Oµ being the observation
mapping. Given these mappings, we will take the domains of the task as a reference, just
making T = Tµ the time domain, A = Iµ the action domain, and Z = Oµ the observation
domain.
The relation between agents, tasks and interfaces can be seen in figure 4. As we see
in definitions 5 and 6, the concept of ‘reward’ does not exist as a separate entity. In case
rewards are used, they are considered part of the task’s output and part of the agent’s inputs.
Note that in reinforcement learning, rewards and observations are considered in a separate
way. One straightforward way to work with rewards is to define task’s outputs (Z = Oµ) as
a tuple 〈L,R〉 where the second term is understood as a reward as in example 2. Obviously,
in order to use rewards, both task and agent have to treat part of their outputs and inputs
(respectively) as a reward.
Note that the score function u˙ is not used in the interface. Consequently, the score is not
visible to the agent and cannot be calculated from the observation (alone) in general. Any
appreciation the task wants to convey to the agent during the interaction must be done using
observations (and possibly embedded rewards). In fact, it is important to see that score can
be completely independent from rewards. This may sound counterintuitive if compared to
typical agents and environments in reinforcement learning, where performance is calculated
as an aggregation of rewards. However, it is important to emphasise that reinforcement
learning is about ‘learning’ and many cognitive tasks are not about learning. In addition,
on many occasions, even in learning scenarios, the performance cannot be derived as an
aggregation of rewards.
It is then important to distinguish between scores and rewards. Scores are the way tasks
are evaluated (so a task must always give a score), while rewards (when they are used) are
a means to condition or indicate the agent should do some actions and should avoid some
other actions. Obviously, the same task can have different results on the same agents if
the mapping φZ (or more properly its inverse, φ−1Z ) leads to an improper correspondence of
rewards to some of the agents’ sensory devices or inputs such that this does not have an
appropriate motivating effect. The interface is a crucial thing, especially when evaluating a
diverse set of agents.
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Definition 6 does not impose any additional constraint over interfaces being injective,
surjective or bijective. However, we think that an appropriate interface should be bijective,
because only in this case can it give us an isomorphic representation of the problem with no
information loss17. The following proposition shows this.
Proposition 1. An interface, as defined in definition 6, cannot introduce additional infor-
mation about the task and cannot withhold any information if and only if all the mappings
are bijective.
Proof. In order to convey extra information, we would need an input x for which we could
choose at least between two possible alternatives y1 and y2, such that φ
−1
Z (x) = y1. Since
in order to convey information these two alternatives must be possible, we would have
φZ(y1) = x and φZ(y2) = x. This cannot be the case since φZ is a bijection. The other
direction of the proof is similar.
This means that an interface that is injective but not surjective or vice versa (or even
neither) will result in a distorted representation of the intended problem —possibly with-
holding or giving additional information. This does not mean that the interface cannot be
helpful for an agent18.
From here, we can have agents interacting in a task. Since agents and tasks may be
non-deterministic, we may have different episodes for the same pair of agent and task.
Definition 7. An episode is a tuple of functions 〈sµ, spi, a, z, u〉, which are the history of the
interaction between a task µ and an agent pi over an interface φ. We denote by sµ(t), spi(t),
a(t), z(t), u(t) the task’s state, agent’s state, action, observation and score, respectively, at
time t ∈ T . A task can be interrupted at any time (e.g., a time limit) or can stop internally.
17Redundant Turing machines are a possibly useful way of seeing how different (Turing) machines with
virtually the same capabilities can be evaluated wrongly with an inadequate interface. Redundant Turing
machines are machines that work with a special coding of the input (such as 00 for 0 and 11 for 1, and –for
inputs not following the code– are either null or perhaps probabilistically dependent upon those inputs which
do follow the code and which are nearest in, e.g., Hamming distance) (Dowe, 2008, sec. 0.2.7)(Herna´ndez-
Orallo & Dowe, 2010, p1514, footnote 6). For example, if we redundantly code 0 and 1 as 01 and 10
respectively, if M is a machine and MR is its redundant counter-part, and (say) M(100) = 0110, then
MR(100101) = 01101001.
18For instance, if a task is the addition of two natural numbers, the task internal representation of the
numbers might be binary, while the interface may convert them into, e.g., a decimal representation. Note that
there is a bijection between numbers in binary representation and decimal representation. Nonetheless, any
transformation, even bijective, may have some potential risks. For instance, consider the task of comparing
two numbers and selecting the highest one, which can be originally represented as 〈a, b〉. This can be
transformed into 〈1, a, b〉 if a < b and 〈0, b, a〉 otherwise. This transformation is bijective, but the task may
become much easier for some agents, since it only implies getting the last element in the tuple. It can be
argued then that there has been some information gain in the sense of (Herna´ndez-Orallo, 2000c), which
means that there might be no additional information in terms of Kolmogorov complexity, but there might
still be some additional processing in terms of Kt complexity (Levin, 1973). Note, however, that this is not
a bijection for the domain set 〈{0, 1},N,N〉. It is only a bijection if the domain set is defined as a subset of
〈{0, 1},N,N〉 where only tuples such that 〈1, a, b〉 if a < b and 〈0, b, a〉 otherwise are accepted. This would
clearly suggest that the domain set is biased for this task, as many encryptions or decryptions would also
be.
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This final time is denoted by tend. The performance (or final score) of agent pi in the episode
is given by u(tend). The functions sµ(t), spi(t), a(t), z(t), u(t) are undefined for t > tend.
4.3. Parametric task, task class and task distribution
Examples 1 and 2 are non-deterministic. In example 1, e.g., the numbers (lights) which
are randomly generated could be set as parameters, and hence each task instance would be
deterministic. Let us define the notion of parametric cognitive task:
Definition 8. A parametric cognitive task µ[X¯], where X¯ represents a tuple of parameters
x1, x2, ..., xp, is a family of tasks such that a task instance can be obtained by giving values
to these parameters.
For instance, task µnc in example 1 can be converted into a parametric cognitive task
µnc[x1, x2] by defining two parameters x1, x2 ∈ B∗ with initial state s(0) = 〈no-rewarding, x1, x2, 0〉.
For example, the task µnc[〈1, 0, 0, 1, 0〉 , 〈1, 0, 0, 0, 0〉] would be an instance.Now we define:
Definition 9. A cognitive task class is a set of cognitive tasks, i.e. any subset of M.
For obvious reasons, task classes are more appropriate than single tasks for evaluating
an ability. In fact, tests usually make a selection (i.e., a sample) of tasks from a task class in
order to avoid, e.g., task specialisation and rote learning. A selection (or sampling) requires
a distribution.
Definition 10. A distribution over a task class M is any discrete probability distribution p
such that it assigns probabilities to tasks, where for all µ ∈ M we have 0 ≤ p(µ) ≤ 1 and∑
µ∈M p(µ) = 1.
An example of a probability distribution for example 1 and its parametric version could
be:
p(µnc[x1, x2]) = 2
(−2(ord(x1)+ord(x2))+1) (2)
where ord represents the order of a tuple. Assuming that ord(x1) ≥ 1 and ord(x2) ≥ 1 we
have that when the total size is 2, the probability is 2−3= 0.125 (with 22 = 4 possibilities,
as the tuples are binary, this makes a total mass of 0.5), when the size is 3, the probability
is 2−5= 0.03125 (with 23 = 8 possibilities, this makes a total mass of 0.25), etc. It is then
easy to see that their sum is 1.
Proposition 2. For every task class M and distribution p there is an equivalent distribution
p′ for the task domain M.
Proof. Just define the distribution p′, where p′(µ) = p(µ) if µ ∈M and 0 otherwise.
This means that a task class can be just defined as a distribution over M.
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4.4. Difficulty
Now we move to the notion of difficulty19 applied to cognitive tasks:
Definition 11. A difficulty (or hardness) function is any function ~ : M → H, with H ⊂
R+ ∪ {0}.
In psychometrics, the difficulty of a task is commonly calculated by the results of a
population over that task. However, while in CTT the difficulty of an item, as the proportion
of examinees passing it, depends on the population in which it is calculated, in IRT we can
apply what is called “parameters invariance”, which means that the parameters of the model
(e.g., b in eq. 1 or any other difficulty parameter) are invariant across populations, provided
it is applied on the same species. As mentioned in section 3.1, there have been a few recent
approaches in IRT which have tried to derive difficulty intrinsically (Sternberg, 2000, chap.
19). This can be traced back to Simon and Kotovsky, who determined item difficulty with
a model for a specific kind of sequential inductive inference task (Simon & Kotovsky, 1963).
The idea was extended (with more difficulties) to other tasks (Kotovsky & Simon, 1990).
This significant project, however, could not be completely fulfilled without the notion of
Kolmogorov complexity, compression and the invariance theorem, as done in (Herna´ndez-
Orallo & Minaya-Collado, 1998), where the difficulty of a task was determined by (a variant
of) its Kolmogorov complexity.
An intrinsic, formal way of determining difficulty is much more appropriate for exploring
the entire machine kingdom since we cannot practically estimate the difficulty of each task
empirically as the mean score obtained by a sample of systems from this kingdom20. All this
suggests the definition of difficulty as a function of some parameters of the cognitive class as
follows:
Definition 12. A parametric difficulty function is a difficulty function which can be defined
solely with the parameters of a parametric cognitive class, i.e. it holds that there is a function
f such that we can express the difficulty function as ~(µ[X¯]) = f(X¯).
An example of difficulty function for example 1 and its parametric version would be
~1(µnc[x, y]) = ord(x)+ord(y), where ord represents the order of a tuple. For instance, given
µ = µnc[〈1, 0, 0, 1, 0〉, 〈1, 0, 0, 0, 0〉] we would have ~1(µ) = 10. Another possible example
is ~2(µnc[x, y]) = min(
∑m
i=1 xi,
∑n
i=1 yi) where x = 〈x1, x2, ..., xm〉 and y = 〈y1, y2, ..., yn〉.
For this difficulty function, we would have ~2(µ) = 1. Finally, another example would be
~3(µnc[x, y]) = min(
∑m
i=1 xi,
∑n
i=1 yi)
max(
∑m
i=1 xi,
∑n
i=1 yi)
. This difficulty function, called the “ratio smaller/larger”
is commonly used in tests of numerical competence (see, e.g. Cantlon & Brannon, 2006).
For this difficulty function, we would have ~3(µ) = 1/2.
19We call it difficulty instead of complexity, especially because in the modern views of complexity derived
from information theory in general, and Kolmogorov complexity in particular, complex things are not nec-
essarily difficult. For instance, a random string is complex (in terms of its Kolmogorov complexity) but not
difficult.
20We can, in principle, do this, by sampling all the computable agents with a distribution, and evaluate
the task on a sample of them. However, this is impractical and it may boil down to assigning difficulties
directly. Also, it is not clear what distribution to use, e.g. a universal distribution (Solomonoff, 1964), a
Darwin-Wallace distribution (Herna´ndez-Orallo et al., 2011) or others.
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Extending the concept of average difficulty to a task class would be very useful since we
usually work with parametric tasks instead of single tasks. For instance, when we refer to
the task of adding two natural numbers, it is in fact a set of tasks (a parameterised task).
Definition 13. The average difficulty of a task class M according to a difficulty function ~
and a probability distribution p is given by:
H(M, p, ~) =
∑
µ∈M
p(µ) · ~(µ)
As we see, the difficulty of the task class depends on the distribution, since it is not the
same to add, e.g., one-digit numbers as ten-digit numbers.
This is a concept which is closely related to the notion of average-case computational
complexity, developed by Leonid Levin in the 1980s (Levin, 1986), which is of course related
to the more general notion of average-case performance of algorithms (see, e.g., Knuth, 1973).
Our concept of difficulty here is not restricted to computational complexity (computational
steps). Rather, the notion of ‘solving a problem’ is generalised to the idea of ‘performing
well’ in a task.
It is easy to see that if the difficulty is bounded (i.e. there exists a c such that for all
µ ∈ M we have that ~(µ) ≤ c), then the difficulty for class M is bounded. For cases where
the difficulty is not bounded, we may have convergence or not, so the derived difficulty for
the class may make sense or not. For instance, for the parametric cognitive task µnc[x1, x2]
derived from example 1, and using the probability distribution in eq. 2 and the difficulty
function ~1 seen above:
H1(µnc, p, ~1) =
∑
µ∈µnc
p(µ) · ~1(µ) =
∑
µ∈µnc
2(−2(ord(x)+ord(y))+1) · (ord(x) + ord(y))
Let us call n = ord(x) + ord(y). Since there are 2n tasks for each n, this leads to:
H1(µnc, p, ~1) =
∞∑
n=1
2n · 2(−2n+1) · n = 2
∞∑
n=1
2(−n) · n = 2 · 2 = 4
For ~2 we also have convergence, since ~2(µ) < ~1(µ) for every task µ. Similarly for ~3. In
other cases, however, this may not bounded. For instance, one of the most general cases
(and also popular in the area of algorithmic information theory) would be to consider all the
tasks using a universal distribution for probability, and Kolmogorov complexity for difficulty.
The following result shows that this appealing choice does not work.
Proposition 3. Consider the set of all cognitive tasks M, an enumeration on them and a
coding over binary strings. We define a universal distribution pU(µ) = 2
−KU (µ), where KU
is the Kolmogorov complexity using U , a prefix UTM. And let us consider the difficulty of a
task as KU . Then, for every U we have that H(M, pU , KU) diverges.
Proof. We can decompose the sum by the size of the tasks in the enumeration, denoted by
l(µ):
H(M, pU , KU) =
∑
µ∈M
2−KU (µ) ·KU(µ) =
∞∑
n=1
∑
µ:l(µ)=n
2−KU (µ) ·KU(µ)
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Elaborating on example 4.3.4 in (Li & Vita´nyi, 2008, page 287), we have that there are at
least 2(n−1) tasks µ with l(µ) = n with n− 1 ≤ KU(µ) ≤ n+ 2 log n+O(1), so:
H(M, pU , KU) ≥
∞∑
n=1
2(n−1) · (2−n 1
n2
2−O(1)) · (n− 1) = 2−O(1)
∞∑
n=1
n− 1
2n2
By divergence of the harmonic series, the last sum diverges.
Despite the previous negative result, we can still use Kolmogorov complexity as a measure
of difficulty and still derive a proper difficulty function for task classes in general. This can be
done by just defining ~(µ) = 1−2−KU (µ) or any other bounded and monotonic transformation
over KU . Similar questions can be posed with other complexity measures, such as Levin’s Kt,
sophistication or logical depth (see Li & Vita´nyi, 2008), which may be more appropriate for
measuring difficulty in general. In case of doubt of divergence, a monotonic transformation
to a bounded difficulty function can be done. In fact, any of these choices would be a much
more comprehensive and general way of assigning difficulty to tasks. This contrasts with ad-
hoc difficulty functions for each task class, as has been generally done in AI and eventually
in animal cognition and psychometrics. For instance, (Zatuchna & Bagnall, 2009) use an
ad-hoc measure of difficulty for mazes. We argue that ~(µ) = 1 − 2−Kt(µ), where Kt is
Levin’s complexity (Levin, 1973) is a good option. This has been discussed and developed in
(Herna´ndez-Orallo & Minaya-Collado, 1998; Herna´ndez-Orallo & Dowe, 2010) for inductive
inference tasks, but can be extended for other kinds of tasks as well (Herna´ndez-Orallo,
2000b,c).
5. Performance indicators: average scores and decompositions
We have not fully investigated the relation among (a) the probability of a task, (b)
its difficulty, and (c) the weight we assign to each task in an overall measure. Different
approaches in measurement make different choices on any of these issues, from CTT to IRT
(e.g., CAT) in psychometrics to new intelligence tests in AI. In what follows, we analyse how
these three issues are necessary for a proper aggregation of results and, as we will see, for an
appropriate test design.
5.1. Expected average score
Given a task class M using the same interface φ, and a probability distribution p, we can
just generate tasks, evaluate agents and calculate the average score as follows:
Definition 14. The expected average score for a task class M , a distribution p, an interface
φ and an agent pi is:
Ψ(M, p, pi) , lim
τ→∞
∑
µ∈M
p(µ) · E(Score(pi, µ, φ, τ)) (3)
where E(Score(pi, µ, φ, τ)) returns the expected value of the score of evaluating pi with µ using
interface φ and time limit τ .
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By sampling over M using the distribution p and using finite time limits, we can ap-
proximate the above measure. The problem of the above definition is that it ignores task
difficulty, and the measure (and the sampling) will be dominated by the probability distribu-
tion. This is, in principle, natural, since the performance for tasks with very low probability
should be less important (for an average or aggregated score) than the performance for very
frequent tasks21. However, when approximating the overall score, many tasks with very high
probability can be very poor discriminators. This, in fact, works well in cases where the
distribution is chosen in such a way that there is no small subset of tasks which dominates
the distribution. But if this small subset exists, we may have agents which specialise on
this subclass, or we may have that many agents perform well on this subset. This is what
happens, e.g., with the intelligence measure in (Legg & Hutter, 2007), which uses a uni-
versal distribution, and a very small (and typically easy) set of tasks often dominates the
distribution, as pointed out by (Hibbard, 2009) and (Herna´ndez-Orallo & Dowe, 2010).
5.2. Decomposition
A different approach is to calculate partial results for a given difficulty h as follows:
U(h,M, p, pi) , lim
τ→∞
∑
µ∈M,~(µ)=h
p(µ|h) · E(Score(pi, µ, φ, τ))
And now, we can aggregate performance for a range of difficulties, e.g., as follows:
Proposition 4. The expected average score Ψ(M, p, pi), assuming difficulty is bounded be-
tween hmin and hmax, can be rewritten as follows (if h is in a discrete domain H, e.g., a
segment in Q or N):
Ψ(M, p, pi) =
hmax∑
h=hmin
U(h,M, p, pi)p(h)
where p(h) is the probability of a task of being of difficulty h. For continuous domains:
Ψ(M, p, pi) =
∫ hmax
hmin
U(h,M, p, pi)f(h)dh
where f(h) is the probability density function of a task being of difficulty h.
21If we have a difficulty function (apart from the distribution), we may have the temptation of redefining
the above eq. (3), using the difficulty as a weight, e.g., using p′(µ) = p(µ)·~(µ)∑ p(µ)·~(µ) , assuming the difficulty
is bounded. With this new distribution, very difficult tasks would be much more frequent. In practice,
however, it would fail in evaluating agents well when the sample over M , the time limits or their ability are
small.
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Figure 5: Two figurative Agent Response Curves for an agent and a set of of items (tasks). Results are shown
in blue. Left: the results seem to fit a linear model (in black). Right: the results seem to fit a log-linear
model (in black). In both cases, we show E(uˆ(0.5)) (the expected score for difficulty 0.5) with a green circle
and E(hˆ(0.5)) (the expected difficulty for score 0.5) with a red circle.
Proof. Let us show the result for the discrete case:
Ψ(M, p, pi) = lim
τ→∞
∑
µ∈M
p(µ) · E(Score(pi, µ, φ, τ))
= lim
τ→∞
hmax∑
h=hmin
∑
µ∈Ms.t.~(µ)=h
p(µ) · E(Score(pi, µ, φ, τ))
=
hmax∑
h=hmin
p(h) lim
τ→∞
∑
µ∈Ms.t.~(µ)=h
p(µ|h) · E(Score(pi, µ, φ, τ))
=
hmax∑
h=hmin
U(h,M, p, pi)p(h)
A similar derivation can be done for the continuous case.
The decomposition suggests which kind of sampling can be more appropriate for esti-
mating Ψ. Nonetheless, the most interesting application of this transformation is that we
can analyse and plot the results easily, e.g., using a uniform distribution of difficulties on
the x-axis.
For simplicity, we will use notation uˆ(h) for any estimation of U(h,M, p, pi). We also
define hˆ(u) = uˆ−1(u). As a concrete example of these concepts, Figure 5 shows the results
of two different agents on the same task class. We call these curves Agent Response Curves
(ARC), following similar names in the area of psychometrics, and IRT in particular (e.g.,
(Sternberg, 2000, chap. 19) use the term Person Characteristic Curves). If p(h) is uniform,
Ψ(M, p, pi) is just the area under the curve (i.e., the integral), either using the discrete real
‘curve’ (e.g., the blue points) or a continuous (parametric) curve (e.g., the black curve).
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Figure 6: Left: a typical result of a CAT test (freely adapted from (Weiss, 2011, Fig. 8)). The black curve
shows a Euclidean kernel smoothing with a constant of 0.1. The final proficiency calculated by the test was
−0.21. Right: a comparison of performance (individual results and linear fit) of two different kinds of agents
for the same task class using a difficulty function (here shown as ‘complexity’), defined as an approximation
of the Kolmogorov complexity of the tasks (originally published in (Insa-Cabrera et al., 2011, Fig. 4)).
Many more things can be observed on each of these figures, and some other indicators
can be obtained. For instance, apart from the area (i.e., Ψ(M, p, pi)), we can distinguish two
interesting indicators. In Figure 5, the first point (the green circle) is where the difficulty
h = 0.5, i.e. E(uˆ(0.5)). Assuming that 0.5 is a medium difficulty, this point is the MDP
(medium-difficulty performance) point (or the width at this point, in Thorndike’s terminology
(Thorndike, 1927)). Similarly, a second point (the red circle) is set where the score u = 0.5,
i.e. E(hˆ(0.5)). Assuming that 0.5 is a medium score and also a monotonically decreasing
curve, this point is the maximum achieved proficiency (difficulty) with at least medium
score, or simply, the MSP (medium-score proficiency) point. This latter point is usually
known as the “point of inflection” in IRT theory (see, e.g. (Sternberg, 2000, chap. 19)), or
the altitude, in Thorndike’s terminology. Neither the area nor any of these points can be
taken as a complete descriptor of how an agent performs. We can find examples of agents
with similar area under the ARC curve, but very different indicator points.
In general, things can even be more elaborate, especially when scores are binomial or
may have a high dispersion. Figure 6 (left) shows a result of the evaluation of an agent using
CAT (Wainer, 2000) (the example is adapted from (Weiss, 2011, Fig. 8)). Since items can
only be either correct or incorrect, the curve is a zigzag for which the calculation of an area
is much more unreliable, if done as an integral, even using a smoothing (here a Euclidean
kernel smoothing with a constant of 0.1 is shown). The final proficiency calculated by the
CAT test in this case is −0.21 (shown as a brown circle), which may be comparable to red
circles (the MSP, medium-score proficiency point) in figure 5. Note that, in this case, the
MSP is very difficult to infer from the curve. The iterative character of CAT based on item
response theory (IRT) is aimed at finding final proficiency with high reliability with the
fewest possible number of items (i.e., evaluations). This proficiency represents the difficulty
level such that probability of guessing the item right at this difficulty is 0.5.
Figure 6 (right) shows the results of two different agents on the same task class using a
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Figure 7: Universal Psychometrics can focus the exploration on any side of the duality.
non-adaptive task generator. Even though score is not binomial in this case, the plot shows
how difficult it is to find the indicators (such as the area22 or the points), since the data
shows a high dispersion.
All this suggests that the way in which items are selected will depend on the kind of tasks
(score domains), the range of difficulties, the expected dispersion, etc. Also, everything will
be different depending on which indicators (or the whole curve) we are interested in. For
instance, if scores are binomial and we want to estimate the MSP (medium-score proficiency)
point, then the CAT approach has developed a robust theory of adaptive tests based on IRT.
If scores are ordinal and we want to estimate the agent response curve, then other techniques
might be useful, such as a distribution-driven Monte Carlo sampling.
In addition, for some indicators, the distribution of difficulty is important (the area), while
for others it is not so (MDP and MSP). Nonetheless, the distribution for each complexity,
i.e. p(µ|h), is always important for estimating the values for each h well.
6. Exploring the machine kingdom
In the previous sections we have set the fundamental pieces for exploring the machine
kingdom Ω, on the one hand, and the space of abilitiesM, on the other hand. This duality is
illustrated in figure 7. The exploration of these two spaces is precisely the goal of Universal
Psychometrics. This and the following sections will only highlight some basic ideas, inspired
by the disciplines which have been mentioned in section 3. We will also see that while some
well-established practices in these disciplines are still valid for universal psychometrics, some
others are not, so alternatives need to be found.
6.1. Cognitive tests
Taking into account that we might use different indicators depending on the kind of
agents, the kind of tasks and different measuring methodologies, we need to define a very
general test algorithm which can fit all these situations.
Definition 15. A Cognitive Test for a task class M and a difficulty function ~ for that class,
is a series of evaluations over tasks in M applied to an agent pi (and an interface set Φ for
each task in class M) as follows:
1. ALGORITHM: Testing Algorithm
2. INPUTS: M (a task class), Φ (interfaces), pi (an agent), ~ (a difficulty function)
3. OUTPUTS: a set of indicators
4. BEGIN
22In addition, the difficulty (here shown as ‘complexity’) seems to be unbounded in this case, so it needs
a bounded monotonic transformation on the x-axis to make the area meaningful.
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5. p1 ← p (Initial task class distribution)
6. τ1 ← τ (Initial allotted time for the task)
7. i← 1
8. REPEAT
9. µi ← ChooseTask(M,pi) (New task)
10. φ← ChooseInterface(Φ, µi, pi) (Choose appropriate interface)
11. (ui, ti)← Eval(pi, µi, φ, τi) (Returns score and actual time)
12. pi+1 ← UpdateDist(i,M, ~, u¯, t¯, τ¯ , p¯, µ¯) (New distribution)
13. τi+1 ← UpdateT ime(i, u¯, t¯, τ¯ , µ¯) (New allotted time)
14. i← i+ 1
15. UNTIL (Stoppingcriterion(i, u¯, t¯, τ¯ , µ¯)) (Until stopping criterion is met)
15. RETURNS Indicators(i, u¯, t¯, τ¯ , µ¯) (Returns a set of indicators)
16. END ALGORITHM
where ChooseTask(M, pi) chooses a task for class M using distribution pi, ChooseInterface(Φ, µi, pi)
just chooses the appropriate interface in Φ for µi (and pi), Eval(pi, µi, φ, τi) performs an
episode of pi for task µi with time limit τi, using the interface φ, UpdateDist(i,M, h, u¯, t¯, τ¯ , p¯, µ¯)
updates the probability, UpdateT ime(i, u¯, t¯, τ¯ , µ¯) updates the time limits, Stoppingcriterion(i, u¯, t¯, τ¯ , µ¯)
decides whether to stop or go on, and, finally, Indicators(i, u¯, t¯, τ¯ , µ¯) returns a set of indi-
cators.
The generality of the algorithm is achieved by allowing all these functions to parameterise
depending on each case. For instance, classical tests in psychometrics and animal cognition
would just be implemented by using a distribution with all the mass on one task initially,
and UpdateDist would switch to another task, independently of the previous agent’s result
(no feedback, no adaptation). Some tests in artificial intelligence can also be in this category.
Adaptive tests in the area of CAT would also use a distribution setting where all the
mass would be assigned to the task which is the most informative one, according to the
statistical technique in use (maximum likelihood, other classical or Bayesian estimators —
such as MML (Wallace & Boulton, 1968; Wallace & Dowe, 1999; Wallace, 2005)), in order
to better (and sooner) estimate proficiency. The stopping criterion typically relies on the
number of iterations or on whether this estimate is reliable. Finally, the anytime intelligence
test defined in (Herna´ndez-Orallo & Dowe, 2010) can also be considered an instance of
definition 15.
6.2. Customised vs. universal tests
A general principle in measurement is that “measurement is more difficult and less effi-
cient the less we know about the subject”. If we have information about the examinee, then
we can customise the test in order to have a more effective and efficient measurement. That
is the reason why several disciplines have customised tests for adult humans, for children,
for people with disabilities, for different species and for different kinds of AI algorithms.
However, there are two reasons why customised tests are inappropriate for exploring the
machine kingdom. On the one hand, customised tests do not allow the straight comparison
between different kinds of agents in an even way, since only with the same task selection
procedure, the same indicators and the same stopping criteria we can reliably compare
results. On the other hand, we may have no (or very little) information about the subject
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we want to evaluate —and this may be the case when evaluating an unknown machine, and
will be much more frequent in the future. In any of these situations we need a test that is
valid for any kind of individual.
Definition 16. A universal test for cognitive task class M is a test which is able to measure
the ability on M for any element in the machine kingdom Ω.
The emphasis is set on “universal”. If a cognitive test is useful for measuring one cognitive
ability for a group (kind, series or species) of systems but useless —or inaccurate— for other
groups, then the test is not universal. Conversely, and following the (physical) Church-Turing
thesis (Copeland, 2008), if a test is able to measure a cognitive ability for any conceivable
machine, then, by the Church-Turing thesis, it will be able to measure this cognitive ability
for animals (and as a consequence, for humans).
The design of universal tests is much more difficult than that of customised tests. One
requirement for a universal test is that it has to be necessarily adaptive, since we do not
know in advance the range of difficulties and the time resolution the agents can take. This
is, for instance, the approach taken in (Herna´ndez-Orallo & Dowe, 2010), which has been
further generalised here in definition 15.
A universal test requires a choice of interfaces beforehand. The important thing is that
the task definitions and the testing procedure are the same. For instance, (Herrmann et al.,
2007) uses the same tasks for human children and adult chimpanzees by carefully changing
the interfaces. Similarly, in (Insa-Cabrera et al., 2011), humans and reinforcement learning
(RL) algorithms are compared on the same task generator but a different interface.
Clearly, universal tests are much more difficult to construct than customised tests (see
Table 1), but they are necessary for exploring the machine kingdom. However, customised
tests are still useful for practical and theoretical purposes, provided there is some degree of
overlapping in the population, in order to make comparisons and alignments of results. In the
end, universal psychometrics has to work with both types of tests: (population-)customised
and universal.
6.3. Populations, normalisation and scaling
The use of a population of agents is the traditional approach in psychometrics. In the ma-
chine kingdom, instead of using an empirical population, we can use a theoretical population.
In order to do that, we need, as well, a distribution over agents.
Definition 17. A population of agents Π is any subset of Ω with an associated probability
distribution ρ from Ω.
Expected average score (definition 14) was presented for a single individual, agent or
subject, but we can extend it for populations.
Ψ(M, p,Π, ρ) , lim
τ→∞
∑
µ∈M
p(µ)
∑
pi∈Π
ρ(pi) · E(Score(pi, µ, φ, τ)) (4)
The decomposition of Ψ(M, p, pi) (definition 14) according to proposition 4 can also be ap-
plied to the above formula, but other decompositions can be figured out, e.g., using the
capabilities of the agents. In fact, in general, the use of agent response curves, such as those
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Feature Population-customised test Universal test
Difficulty Empirical estimation (e.g.,
IRT)
Theoretically-derived, based
on task class
Administration Sequential or adaptive Necessarily adaptive
Discrimination Empirical estimation (e.g.,
IRT)
Theoretically-derived, based
on item diversity
Validity Models of cognitive abilities,
factor analysis, content analy-
sis, significance tests
Formal (computational) mod-
els of cognitive abilities
Scaling Empirical normalisation Theoretically-derived, based
on task class characteristics
Analysis of results (Latent) factor analysis, signif-
icance tests
Significance tests
Conditioning Instruction, final reward Rewards
Table 1: Comparison of measurement features. The table shows how measurement features can be typically
addressed in customised tests for a well-known population (e.g. humans) vs. universal tests.
depicted in figures 5 and 6, is more frequently applied to compare populations (or species)
rather than comparing specific individuals (see, e.g., page 431 in Sternberg, 2000). Figure 6
(right) is an example of this.
The use of populations (either empirical or theoretical) may suggest their use for nor-
malising or scaling scores and difficulties. For instance, one option for an ‘absolute’ scaling
would be to select all the agents in Ω and set this average as a zero point. This would be a
generalisation of what is done for IQ tests, which use a Gaussian distribution with mean at
100 and standard deviation 15 (or 16, in some tests), over a population. However, how can
we sample from Ω, the set of all agents? We may suggest using a universal distribution over
Ω. However, this would be very sensitive to the reference machine used for the universal
distribution. Also, for most reference machines, the agents with shortest descriptions would
probably have very anomalous behaviours (such as not reacting at all, as a ‘dead’ agent).
A different approach would be to scale the scores by using a reference or baseline machine,
chosen to score, e.g., 0. This can be done as follows.
When time between actions is not considered in the measurement and the set of actions
A is finite, then a proper reference agent is a random agent pirand, as an agent which chooses
uniformly in A. This is the approach taken in (Herna´ndez-Orallo & Dowe, 2010), where
tasks (and scores) are chosen in such a way that:
∀µ, τ E(Score(pirand, µ, φ, τ)) = 0 (5)
where scores range between −1 and 1. Eq. 5 implies that (but it is not a necessary condition
for) Ψ(M, p, pirand) = 0. The notions of performing worse than random or better than random
are meaningful and appropriate. This is similar to the statistical correction in multiple choice
questions, where the result is corrected by the probability of guessing it right by chance.
When A is infinite, the notion of random agent becomes more elusive, since we cannot use
a uniform distribution.
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When time is considered, the choice of a reference agent is much more difficult, since
there are many possibilities of how time can be considered (and its relation to performance,
see, e.g., Herna´ndez-Orallo, 2010). The use of a constant-pace random-action agent is not a
good reference either, since we need to arbitrarily determine an action rate. In general, there
is no reference agent that can be used for all tasks. However, for any class task, we may be
able to find a reasonable reference agent and scale the bottom of the score accordingly.
6.4. Evaluating development: potential vs. actual intelligence
The notions of potential versus actual abilities are usually linked to the ‘nature’ vs.
‘nurture’ debate (Eysenck, 2007). What can we say in general for non-human animals and
machines? Several efforts have been made to bring up apes in a human context. While the
results show that some improvement can be shown because of the enriched human context,
animal abilities are limited by their genes. What about machines? Things are more complex
here. Theoretically, it is possible to construct a machine such that it is unintelligent until an
appropriate “training” signal is received, when it changes into another state where it becomes
intelligent (Solomonoff, 1962). In fact, for any universal Turing machine (UTM) there is an
input —a program— such that the machine becomes any particular other machine, e.g., a
machine with any degree of actual intelligence. So we could loosely say that any UTM has
maximal potential intelligence (and the same applies for any cognitive ability). However,
if we construct a second machine such that this second state is accessed much more easily
(without the need of a very specific input), we can intuitively say that the second machine
has more potential intelligence.
This suggests an indirect way of measuring “potential” intelligence (and other abilities).
This can be done by using distributions of “lives” (or training environments). The distribu-
tion and life span of the environment may be used to parameterise the definition.
Naturally, potential abilities (e.g., potential intelligence) are very difficult to measure but
this issue cannot be ignored23, since it is quite unlikely that we can construct an algorithm
such that it makes a machine intelligent the first day. Surely, the machine will require some
training. How difficult the training is will of course be related to potential abilities. This
raises of course the idea that the goal of artificial intelligence is perhaps to construct potential
intelligence rather than actual intelligence, which is closely related to the construction of
systems that learn. Creating an “AI baby” has been an idea that is not new in the discipline
(Turing, 1950; Solomonoff, 1962; Goertzel & Bugaj, 2009). If this is finally the right track
in AI, then universal psychometrics will be absolutely necessary, and inductive inference
abilities will play a central role in the analysis of potential versus actual intelligence. For
a more extensive account of the notion of potential intelligence for machines, we refer to
(Herna´ndez-Orallo & Dowe, 2013).
23This is also important ethically, since our notion of “person” is related to “potential” intelligence rather
than “actual” intelligence. Babies have human rights, some years before they can show much “actual”
intelligence.
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7. Exploring the space of abilities
The relation between abilities is one of the most debated issues in psychometrics, where
many different models have been proposed, as we saw in section 3. Exploring the space of
abilities (or, more precisely, the space of tasks, see figure 7) in general (i.e., in the machine
kingdom) seems even more challenging and controversial.
7.1. Validity, reliability and relations among abilities
Validity, in the most classical meaning, can be expressed as the correspondence between
a set of tasks and the ability it is supposed to measure. How can we choose a representative
set of tasks for an ability? We can find the correspondence between abilities (or other
constructs, such as factors), and the instruments (the task classes and the tests) using
empirical techniques (such as factor analysis) over a population. However, any conclusion
we may reach will only be applicable to that population. For instance, if we find that
numerical abilities and spatial abilities correlate in humans, that does not mean that this
should also be the case for, e.g., chimpanzees, or other machine subpopulations. On the other
hand, an empirical approach using the whole set of agents M seems clearly unrealistic. A
theoretical approach seems, then, the alternative.
Theoretical approaches in psychometrics exist and validation is seen as the result of ac-
cumulating evidence supporting the theoretical model and “to provide a sound scientific
basis for the proposed score interpretations” (AERA, APA & NCME, 1999). However, tasks
and abilities are not mathematically formalised. Nonetheless, a mere formalisation of a task
does not yield its full potential unless it is derived from a meaningful definition of a cog-
nitive ability. For instance, inductive inference has been rigorously formalised while still
corresponding to its intuitive notion. This can be found in Solomonoff’s theory of predic-
tion (Solomonoff, 1964) (using a mixture of models) and the theory of inductive inference
based on the Minimum Message Length (MML) principle (Wallace & Boulton, 1968) (using
just one model, obtained by two-part compression), both related to Kolmogorov complexity
(Wallace & Dowe, 1999; Li & Vita´nyi, 2008). In (Herna´ndez-Orallo & Minaya-Collado, 1998;
Herna´ndez-Orallo, 2000a) these formal theories of inductive inference are adapted to gener-
ate exercises of inductive inference ability. With this, the validity of the tests has a better
foundation from the start, and we have more tools to assess difficulty, to derive measures or
conditions for discrimination, and, in the end, to derive tests which can get higher reliability.
The same can be done for other general or specific abilities, such as deductive abilities or
rote memory, which seem easier, while spatial abilities and verbal abilities seem more difficult
(but not impossible) to define in a formal way. In (Herna´ndez-Orallo, 2000b) some of these
abilities are defined based on the notion of information gain (Herna´ndez-Orallo, 2000c),
which allows for the derivation of “difficulty” for deductive problems as well, also using
Kolmogorov complexity. Using this theory, there are some proposals for more challenging
abilities, such as creativity (Dowe, 2008; Schmidhuber, 2010, sec. 0.2.7, p545, col. 1)(Dowe,
2011, sec. 7.7). Extending the set of abilities is necessary if we do not want to limit universal
psychometrics to intelligence —or a very small facet of it. Some experiments performed
with the first computational definitions and tests of intelligence have shown that some non-
intelligent systems scored competitively when compared to humans in some of these tests
(Insa-Cabrera et al., 2011). Although we can look for the reason in how the tests were
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derived or administered, we have to acknowledge that we have also seen this phenomenon
for custom IQ tests (Sanghi & Dowe, 2003). In any case, this still means that intelligence
testing (and, needless to say, other abilities) must consider broader definitions and sets of
tasks than those considered to date with the computational approach.
A mathematical and precise definition of each ability is not only important for validity
and reliability but also for finding relations between abilities. This approach configures
correlation (or, more properly, relation) as an absolute and not a relative property. For
example, without a proper formalisation of abilities, it is very difficult to know whether some
abilities correlate because they go together with the species (or even with all mammals) or
rather because they must go together. For instance, it is well known that deductive abilities
are required for inductive abilities. Consistently, they correlate in humans and perhaps this
holds in general.
This is indeed related to the idea of falsifiability. Consistently finding that two cognitive
abilities always correlate for a certain species (or even for many species) does not prove that
the two cognitive abilities are similar. There is always the possibility that a new species (or
individual), or a machine, can show a behaviour where these two abilities do not go together.
7.2. General abilities, intelligence and no free lunch
Another question is whether some complex cognitive abilities can be defined from simpler
ones, as done typically in a hierarchical way in psychometrics. Again, the hierarchy should be
derived theoretically rather than empirically. If we look at AI, though, it is difficult to find a
similar thing. The closest notion where we can see several distinguished abilities is when we
take a look at the table of contents of any AI handbook. There we usually find a “taxonomy”,
where each chapter corresponds to subdisciplines in AI such as machine learning, automated
deduction, planning, natural language processing, pattern recognition, perception, multi-
agent systems, social intelligence, creativity, etc. It is easy to find a correspondence between
these disciplines and the abilities usually recognised in psychometrics. Nonetheless, in AI
there is no such a thing as a uniform measuring methodology for all of them. In fact, there
is no consensual methodology in any of them separately.
Some models in psychometrics have suggested a hierarchical view of cognitive abilities
and/or factors (Jensen, 1998)(Sternberg, 2000, chap. 3), where general intelligence is typi-
cally at the top, with more specific abilities at a second (or third) level. From this hierarchical
view and the definition of cognitive task classes as given here, we can suggest the notion
of the most general ability as performance in all tasks. In our context, this boils down to
performance in M, the set of all possible tasks. The question is how the distribution over
this set is chosen. As we know, this cannot be chosen uniformly, becauseM is a recursively
enumerable infinite set of tasks. In addition, some other ‘regular’ choices give problems. For
instance, distributions cannot be symmetrical in terms of scores:
Proposition 5. Assume that we have a probability distribution p over M giving the same
probability to any task µ⊕ in M and its ‘complementary’ task µ	 in M, which is exactly
equal to µ⊕ except that u˙1 = −u˙2. Under this assumption, any agent performs equally with
expected average score 0.
Proof. Consider that agent pi scores σ on task µ. SinceM contains all tasks, there is a task
µ′ such that µ and µ′ are complementary. Since scores are complementary, it must score −σ.
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Hence:
Ψ(M, p, pi) = lim
τ→∞
∑
µ∈M
p(µ) · E(Score(pi, µ, φ, τ))
can be decomposed as M =M⊕ ∪M	 ∪M0 (with M⊕ ∩M	 = 0 and M0 being the set
of tasks where u˙ is everywhere 0). Then,
Ψ(M, p, pi) = Ψ(M⊕, p⊕, pi) + Ψ(M	, p	, pi) + 0
= lim
τ→∞
∑
µ∈M⊕
p⊕(µ) · E(Score(pi, µ, φ, τ)) + lim
τ→∞
∑
µ∈M	
p	(µ) · E(Score(pi, µ, φ, τ))
Since the probabilities are the same, p⊕ = p	 and scores symmetrical and bounded (see
definition 5), this leads to:
Ψ(M, p, pi) = lim
τ→∞
∑
µ∈M⊕
p⊕(µ) · E(Score(pi, µ, φ, τ))− lim
τ→∞
∑
µ∈M⊕
p⊕(µ) · E(Score(pi, µ, φ, τ)) = 0
Then for every pi we have that Ψ(M, p, pi) = 0.
The previous case is just a possible situation where discriminative power is zero. For
example, there are other distributions where all agents always perform equally
Proposition 6. If a distribution over M gives probabilities to the score functions indepen-
dently from the rest of the task, i.e., there are two probability distributions pu and pt such
that for all µ (defined as the tuple 〈T ,S,O, I, s˙, o˙〉 and a score function u˙), we have that:
p(µ) = pu(u˙)× pt(〈T ,S,O, I, s˙, o˙〉)
then any agent performs equally.
Proof. Here we just need to see that scores are independent of what the agent does (on
average).
Fortunately, the previous proposition does not hold for any subset ofM such that rewards
are used and they are positively correlated with final score. All this implies that task classes
must be chosen in such a way that scores must be meaningful and related to the task.
The previous results are closely related to the “no free lunch” theorems, whose more
general (and less technical) version state that “any two algorithms are equivalent when their
performance is averaged across all possible problems” (Wolpert & Macready, 2005), while the
average uses “any distribution over objective functions which is invariant under permutation
of the space of candidate solutions”. In proposition 6 we have a related version of invariance
for score functions and in proposition 5 we can see a restricted view of permutation, with
similar consequences.
The no free lunch theorems can also be applied to specific abilities and not to the overall
mixture of tasks. For instance, if we take the task class of predicting binary sequences, if
all sequences are equally probable (or, more properly, if probabilities are preserved after
partial permutation) then any evaluable system will get the same result. In fact, this is
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interesting, because if we do that, i.e., if the no-free-lunch theorems were of applicability,
then no IQ test would be valid, since any answer in a test would be equally reasonable. This
is the “subjectivity objection” again (see section 3.1), i.e., the plausibility of 9 following
1,3,5,7 would be the same as 1 following it. And, in the end, measurement of many abilities
covering an infinite number of possibilities would be simply impossible.
Fortunately, the assumption that given a set of tasks representing an ability all should
be equally probable is not sustainable. On the one hand, when these sets are infinite the
probability is zero. On the other hand, it is not true that all problems are equally probable.
This leads to the notion of universal distributions derived from Kolmogorov Complexity,
known as the Solomonoff prior. Although this option is not the only possible way of assigning
non-zero probabilities to an infinite set, the use of this kind of prior has several reasonable
properties (Li & Vita´nyi, 2008). In some way or another, most of the approaches based on
information theory in Section 3.3 have used this distribution. In fact, some recent results
by Hibbard (2009) show “rigorous support that an intelligence measure must be based on
unequal weighting of environments, such as the weighting based on Kolmogorov complexity”.
However, universal distributions are not immune to low or zero discriminative power. For
tasks, for example, there might be universal distributions (depending on the machine) for
which proposition 5 can be applied. For instance, consider a machine such that the first bit
of the program is always used to say whether the scores are negated or not. For each task
we would have an equivalent task with the symmetrical score result and equal description
size (and equal algorithmic probability).
This does not happen if we use meaningful rewards and performance is defined as an
average of rewards. So, it is the combination of non-uniform distributions with a proper
assignment of scores which makes the use of the whole (or a big family in)M possible (and
meaningful) as formalisations of very general abilities (e.g., intelligence), such as the C-test
(Herna´ndez-Orallo & Minaya-Collado, 1998), the so-called universal intelligence measure
(Legg & Hutter, 2007) and the anytime intelligence test (Herna´ndez-Orallo & Dowe, 2010).
Finally, the definition of intelligence as performance on all tasks (with a proper distribu-
tion) connects with the role of the g factor. If any cognitive ability is seen as corresponding
to a subset over M, then good performance on M is expected to imply good performance
in significant big subsets of M, which may represent other abilities, as happens with g24.
We have to be cautious about this, as some early tests using algorithmic information theory
have a high g-factor load but have been shown to be insufficient to evaluate the multi-
faceted concept of intelligence, especially if these tests are applied to non-human animals
and machines. Similarly, some (new) emergent properties can appear as the result of a com-
bination of several subsystems lacking these properties, such as neural computing systems,
24A possible understanding of the g factor in this context of distributions is to link it with the invariance
theorem (a universal Turing machine provides an optimal means of description, up to an additive constant),
first proven by Ray Solomonoff (Solomonoff, 1964) and also with his other very important theorem on the
bounds on prediction error (Solomonoff, 1978), which can be extrapolated (with somewhat less tight bounds)
to the related –but different– problem of inductive inference (Dowe, 2011, sec. 4). It is not a surprise then,
as it has been found in humans, that “inductive reasoning is the primary ability most commonly associated
with g” (Sternberg, 2000, chap. 14), since this would be the ability of learning to perform well in any other
ability.
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multi-agent systems, swarms, multi-player games, robotic teams, social networks, etc., with
varying degrees and types of connection topologies, communication protocols or languages.
This is not only important to the present and future of cognitive systems and (artificial)
intelligence but it is our contention that it may provide greater impetus for the unification
in universal psychometrics.
8. Discussion
‘Universal psychometrics’, as presented so far, opens many new questions and may be
subject to many objections. The most important objection is about its feasibility. We do
not expect a conclusive answer to this objection, as this will be, in any case, a progressive
endeavour, where better and more general theories and tools will be eventually introduced.
In this paper, we have just outlined some fundamental elements and properties, which may
of course be questioned and revised in the future. Nonetheless, the construction of tests
for the machine kingdom cannot be eluded. The following decades will increasingly demand
cognitive tests for new cognitive systems, including machines and hybrids. Once (and if) the
technological singularity (Solomonoff, 1962; Good, 1965; Solomonoff, 1985) is achieved, this
will be a necessity (Herna´ndez-Orallo & Dowe, 2010, p1509 and p1536).
Of course we can have ethical objections. Some could say that it is too pretentious to put
humans, non-human animals, machines and hybrids (and communities) thereof on the same
scale, and measuring them with the same ruler. We cannot disagree more. Measuring things
with the same rulers is one of the principles in science. That does not mean that it has to
be one ruler but rather a set of (possibly related) rulers for many abilities. The fact that the
‘scala naturae’ scheme (see section 3.2) has been abandoned in evolution and in the study
of cognition does not mean that we cannot have different scales for many abilities. What we
argue here is that the ruler for each ability must be the same for all. In fact, focussing on
intelligence alone may give a poor characterisation of the agents we want to evaluate, since it
is the range of abilities and the results an agent obtains in each of them which characterises
the agent.
We have clearly defined the machine kingdom as the set of all resource-bounded com-
putable machines. There is an exceptional opportunity whenever a realm or field of study
is broadened. The good thing about universal psychometrics —and the ruling principle for
the discipline— is that its tests are falsifiable (in Popper’s sense) by experimentation. If
a test is assumed to measure an ability and we find (or construct) a subject for which the
test repeatedly evaluates the ability in a wrong way, then we have falsified the test. This
principle has been used regularly in psychometrics, but the scope of the machine kingdom
(including virtually any possible system) makes falsifiability more powerful. For instance,
for humans, it has been shown that several abilities correlate, but we do not know whether
these abilities correlate theoretically or whether it is just because they happen frequently
together. Evaluating these abilities on machines (which is far easier than on other animals)
may help us to clarify some of these questions.
Nonetheless, it is important to state that we are not proposing here that classical and
functional IQ tests should be replaced by more general “universal” tests when the goal is
evaluating humans or better understanding human intelligence. Most probably, universal
tests will be less effective, since they assume fewer things about the examinee. Evaluating
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humans and animals has many specific issues which are difficult to address with such a
general view originating from universal psychometrics, such as the notion of “species”, the
evolutionary background, the genetic load, the appraisal of intelligence development, etc.
The view of “universal psychometrics” as a superdiscipline should be better substituted by
a view of “universal psychometrics” as an overlapping or transversal discipline which would
allow the exchange of theories, techniques and methodologies among some of the previously
isolated disciplines. However, universal psychometrics should be mainly constructed from
formal, computational, principles. In this sense, this work has presented the foundations
of a general approach for universal psychometrics, with the space of evaluable systems (the
machine kingdom) and the space of tasks as the field of study. We have revisited and formally
redefined the notions of (expected) performance, difficulty, interface, test, etc., and we have
discussed some key issues around them, as well as some results showing possible directions
—and some dead-ends, too.
The general perspective of universal psychometrics enlarges both the theoretical and the
experimental possibilities. In one direction, we can bring the experience, terminology, exper-
imentation methodology, findings and expertise from psychometrics to the realm of machine
intelligence measurement and to the field of AI in general. In particular, AI evaluation
may receive an important impact from the view of a cognitive system being characterised
by the diversity and degree of its cognitive abilities, the analysis of the relation between
the spectrum of abilities, the distinction between traits and measuring instruments, or the
borrowing of item response theory, as well as other theories and concepts developed in psy-
chometrics. In the other direction, as already mentioned, we can derive tasks and problems
from non-anthropocentric mathematical principles, and determine their difficulty theoret-
ically. Similarly, as the areas of animal behaviour and cognition have become more and
more related to computational disciplines such as artificial life, artificial evolution, swarm
computation and biorobotics, there are many possibilities to be explored when we focus on
cognitive system evaluation and ability measurement. The notion of animat can be cru-
cial in this connection, as different animats need to be compared to real animals (and other
animats) and the evaluation tools can benefit from comparative cognition and artificial intel-
ligence alike. Finally, universal psychometrics can strengthen the already regular connections
between psychometrics and comparative cognition, as there is a continuum in the machine
kingdom between animats and androids; avatars, assistants, robots, chatterbots and robotic
pets are designed and chosen because of their range of abilities and personality.
It is very difficult to tell how much time and effort it will take to get a universal in-
telligence test which could be applied to any machine, and, as a result of the physical
Church-Turing thesis, as already discussed, be applicable to any animal, including humans,
or any hybrid or collective. It is perhaps better to ask the question for some other sim-
pler cognitive abilities, and see whether an aggregated cognitive ability called intelligence
makes sense in the context of universal psychometrics. Also, in this paper we have mostly
talked about cognitive abilities, but there are some other features and traits which would be
useful to measure on machines, in the same way psychology and psychiatry do: empathy,
aggressiveness, perseverance, etc. But this is still further away.
We can conclude referring to the main motivation already expressed by some earlier works
in the 1990s about measuring cognitive systems: artificial intelligence requires an accurate,
non-anthropocentric, meaningful and formal way of evaluating its progress, by evaluating its
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artefacts.
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